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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past few decades, teamwork has gained more and more in importance and it
is surely but steadily replacing individual work in the workplace. At the same time,
there is evidence from psychology (e.g., Brennan and Enns (2015)) and management
science (e.g., Harvard Business School Press (2004)) that working in teams is more
eﬃcient than working alone. Therefore, it is not surprising that teamwork is becoming
more and more popular. This trend is especially visible in academia. Wuchty, Jones,
and Uzzi (2007) have shown that in an increasing number of ﬁelds, the number of
research done in teams dominates single-authored works not only in numbers but also
in average citations. But teamwork is not just restricted to the workplace. Working in
groups is also popular in classrooms all over the world (Hutchinson (2001)) and even
in sports, team-based sports usually overshadow individual sports in popularity.
But working in teams creates problems, which do not occur when working alone. In
this work, I will discuss three diﬀerent problems inherent to teamwork: Coordination
problems, moral-hazard problems and how to evaluate and compare the results of dif-
ferent teams.
Coordination problems, are problems in which the incentives of the team members
are perfectly aligned but they have to coordinate on one of the available options. An
example for this is agreeing on norms or technical standards, like a communications
protocol for computers.
However, when working in a team, incentives are rarely perfectly aligned. When team
members share a common goal but have to exert private eﬀort, which cannot be ob-
served, moral-hazard problems come into play. The most commonly known eﬀect of
moral hazard is free-riding: Having more team members can lead to everyone working
at ineﬃciently low levels.
The last problem discussed in this work is how to evaluate and compare the results of
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diﬀerent teams or parts of teams. This is a problem occurring in many diﬀerent set-
tings, however, here we are going to focus on an application in sports: What ranking
scheme should we use when teams only compete one-on-one?
In this thesis I am going to address each of the three aforementioned problems, using
diﬀerent methods, including game theory (Chapters 2 and 3), laboratory experiments
(Chapter 2) and statistical modeling (Chapter 4).
In Chapter 2, based on a joint work with Davit Khantadze, we are analyzing coordi-
nation problems. A coordination problem might occur if you have lost your spouse in
a department store and both of you are trying to ﬁnd each other. In this example you
have to try to guess the place your spouse will go to. At the same time she has to
guess where you are going to be. This complicates the (seemingly simple) question of
Will she look for me at the coﬀee bar or at the exit? which now depends not only on
the answer to the question Does she think I am looking for her at the coﬀee bar or at
the exit? but also on the answers to Does she think that I think that she thinks that
I am looking for her at the coﬀee bar or at the exit? and on inﬁnitely more levels of
so-called beliefs.
We are using a game theoretic model to analyze if higher-order beliefs play an im-
portant role in coordination problems when the players are facing a pure coordination
game, i.e., a game in which the players have perfectly aligned preferences. To do so,
we are using a laboratory experiment in which we introduce cognitive types into a pure
coordination game in which there is no common knowledge about the distribution of
cognitive types. In our experiment, around 76% of the subjects managed to coordi-
nate on the payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium despite the absence of common knowledge.
However, around 9% of the players had ﬁrst-order beliefs that lead to coordination
failure and another 9% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs. Fur-
thermore, we compare our results with predictions of diﬀerent models of higher-order
beliefs, commonly used in the literature.
In Chapter 3, I am analyzing a model in which there is not only unobservable eﬀort
choice but in addition uncertainty about the requirements to complete a project, i.e.,
the players don't know how much they have to work to complete it.
In the model, I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect
monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a
breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The eﬀort needed to achieve such a
breakthrough is unknown but players have a common prior about its distribution. Each
player is only able to observe their own eﬀort, not the eﬀort of others. I characterize
the optimal eﬀort path for general distributions of breakthrough eﬀorts and show that,
in addition to free-riding, a delay of eﬀort and an encouragement eﬀect, similar to
Bolton and Harris (1999) arises. In this model, the encouragement eﬀect increase and
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decrease the work players put into the project, depending on the type of uncertainty
faced. Furthermore, the delay of eﬀort is also a result of rational and even welfare-
maximizing behavior.
In Chapter 4, a joint work with Johannes Tiwisina, we develop a statistical model to
describe results in sports and discuss its implications on diﬀerent ranking schemes.
In most sports, we don't just have teams competing against each other but these
teams are usually also organized in associations like the FIFA or UEFA for soccer or
the NCAA for college sports in the United States. In these organizations there are
frequent discussions about the way a tournament or league should be organized to
ensure that, in the end, the best team wins. One example for this is the discussion
during the recent (2016) European Championship in which the system was changed to
accommodate more teams into the tournament. But also leagues change their system.
In soccer, most countries changed from a 2-points-for-a-win to a 3-points-for-a-win sys-
tem between 1980 and 2000 and in 2014 the NCAA made a widely discussed change
to the scoring system of the ﬁrst devision of college football.
We seek to ﬁnd the statistical model that most accurately describes empirically ob-
served results in sports. The idea of transitive relations concerning the team strengths
is implemented by imposing a set of constraints on the outcome probabilities. We
theoretically investigate the resulting optimization problem and draw comparisons to
similar problems from the literature. We propose a branch-and-bound-algorithm for an
exact solution and a heuristic method for quickly ﬁnding a good solution. Finally we
apply the described methods to panel data from soccer, American football and tennis
and also use our framework to compare the performance of empirically applied ranking
schemes.
3
Chapter 2
Higher-order Beliefs about Cognitive
Skills Can Lead to Coordination
Failure
2.1 Introduction
If you have lost your spouse in a department store and both of you are trying to ﬁnd
each other, the answer to the (seemingly simple) question of Will she look for me at
the coﬀee bar or at the exit? depends not only on the answer to the question Does
she think I am looking for her at the coﬀee bar or at the exit? (i.e., something we
will call the ﬁrst-order belief) but also on the answers to Does she think that I think
that she thinks that I am looking for her at the coﬀee bar or at the exit? (i.e., the
second-order belief or What is her ﬁrst-order belief?) and on inﬁnitely more levels of
beliefs. This chapter addresses the question if people actually use beliefs of a higher
order.
When modeling human behavior, we usually assume that players have common knowl-
edge about the structure of the game, i.e., that all players know the structure, that
all players know that everyone else knows the structure and so on ad inﬁnitum. Fur-
thermore, we assume that players do not only have common knowledge about publicly
known properties of the game but also about the distributions of unknown factors of
the game, like the other players' types (for example if I'd rather wait at the coﬀee bar
or the exit). As the absence of common knowledge leads to complex belief hierarchies,
so called higher-order beliefs, common knowledge is usually assumed for tractability
reasons. The ﬁrst level of these beliefs, so called ﬁrst-order beliefs, might be a belief
over the other player's type. A second-order belief would then be a belief over the be-
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lief of the other player about your type (i.e., a belief over the other player's ﬁrst-order
belief) and so on. The question we are trying to answer in this chapter is, how large
the inﬂuence of the assumption of common knowledge is and if people use higher-order
beliefs in coordination games.
More important applications than the search for ones husband or wife in a department
store are suggested by recent studies in sociology and development studies, for example
by Bicchieri (2005). She claims that common knowledge plays a signiﬁcant role in the
ﬁght against female genital mutilation.1 Female genital mutilation is practiced in,
predominately African, communities and is required in many of these communities to
ﬁnd a husband and to prevent social exclusion. Despite being very dangerous and
unnecessary, it has a long standing tradition and is, in areas where it is still practiced,
very common. It is estimated to eﬀect up to 200 million women in 2016 (UNICEF
(2016)). In game theoretic terms the problem is one of equilibrium selection: There
is one equilibrium in which everyone accepts and uses female genital mutilation and
one in which no one does. The latter equilibrium is, given enough knowledge about
the subject, clearly better for everyone, but we still observe the former equilibrium in
many communities.
An important tool in the ﬁght against female genital mutilation is to inform people
about the dangers and (lack of) beneﬁts of it. However, studies like Bicchieri (2005)
suggest that just educating might not be enough. She claims that common knowledge of
this education plays an important role because negative beliefs about the opinion of the
other members of a community might prevent a coordination on the better equilibrium
(i.e., the one without female genital mutilation): Even if I am convinced that this
practice should be abolished, I might still partake in it, to prevent my daughters from
being excluded from the community, as the others might not be convinced (i.e., my
ﬁrst-order belief is that others have not been educated). I also might think that others
will continue this practice because they think I wasn't educated (i.e., because of my
second-order belief) and so on.
That means, that just educating a family (or, in game theoretic terms: changing their
type) does not necessarily lead them to change their stance on female genital mutilation.
But is there any evidence that families use beliefs? Mackie (1996) and Mackie and
LeJeune (2009) have compared the old Chinese tradition of foot binding2 and female
genital mutilation and pointed out that both are similar: Both are required to ﬁnd a
1Most studies, however, don't use the terms beliefs or common knowledge but describe this
concepts in their own words, frequently restricting their attention to ﬁrst-order and therefore ignoring
higher-order beliefs.
2Foot binding was a Chinese practice of bending and binding the four lower toes of young girls
tightly under the foot.
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husband, while being very painful and dangerous without having any known beneﬁts.
Furthermore, they have a long-standing tradition (both can be traced back more than
1000 years) and were widely spread in their respective cultures. However, around 1910,
foot binding has dropped in certain parts of China from 99% to under 1% prevalence
over the course of just 20 to 30 years, without any change in policy (Gamble (1943),
Keck and Sikkink (1998)), whereas even a combined eﬀort of the UN, several NGOs and
governments over the last 40 years resulted only in a moderate decline from about 51%
to 37% of women eﬀected by female genital mutilation in certain countries (UNICEF
(2016)). Mackie (1996) claims that the main diﬀerence is the method of information
transmission: In China, societies have been founded in which members publicly pledged
to not bind their daughters' feet and to prevent their sons from marrying women with
bound feet, whereas the eﬀort to prevent female genital mutilation was mainly focused
on changing the laws and educating the people about the dangers and problems. The
societies ﬁghting foot binding made the education and position of the families common
knowledge whereas most organizations ﬁghting female genital mutilation focused on
changing the opinion of the families without changing the higher-order beliefs.
But also between projects ﬁghting female genital mutilation there have been diﬀer-
ences. Tostan, a Senegal-based NGO, has, according to World Bank Group (2012)
successfully reduced the number of female genital mutilation in some parts of Senegal
signiﬁcantly. So, why did Tostan succeed where others have failed? They claim that
not only education but [...] public declarations are critical in the process for total
abandonment [of female genital cutting] (Tostan (2016)) and are supported by World
Bank Group (2012) who emphasizes that education together with public discussion
and public declaration was an important factor in Tostan's success.
These examples suggest that beliefs might play an important role, as the more suc-
cessful campaigns against foot binding and female genital mutilation also addressed
higher-order beliefs by introducing common knowledge whereas others who focused on
pure education have been less successful. However, it is not clear that common knowl-
edge is required to achieve coordination. It might be suﬃcient to explain that others
have also been educated (i.e., to take care of the ﬁrst-order beliefs), which would be
much cheaper than providing common knowledge. Therefore, the question if people
actually use higher-order beliefs is an important one.3
Unfortunately, the game theoretical literature is not able to model these higher-order
beliefs consistently: In practice many diﬀerent assumptions and models of higher-order
beliefs exist and many of these lead to very diﬀerent predictions even in simple games
3More examples in which common knowledge plays an important role can be found in Chwe (2013).
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like the pure coordination game we are using in this chapter.4 The question, what kind
of model of higher-order beliefs players actually use, seems to be an empirical question
which we are trying to address in this chapter.
We are analyzing the eﬀect of absence of common knowledge in an experimental setting,
using a certain type of simple coordination games to ensure that the eﬀect of strategic
uncertainty is reduced to a minimum, i.e., players have no incentive to outsmart the
other players. In these games, there is uncertainty about the type of the other player,
but no common knowledge about the distribution of these types. We are building on
the work of Blume and Gneezy (2010) who have shown that beliefs matter, i.e., that
some people use beliefs that cause coordination failure. Using and extending their
design, we are trying to answer the following three questions:
 Are players able to coordinate in the absence of common knowledge?
 Can coordination fail because players underestimate the skill of the other players?
Or, in other words, do ﬁrst-order beliefs matter?
 Can coordination fail because players think too much about what others might
think? Or, in other words, do higher-order beliefs matter?
Using Blume and Gneezy's (2000) 5-sector disc, we were able to ﬁnd answers to all three
questions: In the experiment, the majority of players had no problem coordinating on
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium of the game. However, some players switch to the
worse equilibrium because of ﬁrst- and higher-order beliefs.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.1.1, we will give an overview of the
relevant literature and how our work ﬁts into it. Then we will explain an example of
the game we use in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 we will explain the model and brieﬂy
discuss predictions made by some commonly used models of higher-order beliefs for this
game and formalize the three questions stated before in Section 2.4. This is followed by
the experimental design in Section 2.5 and the results of the experiment in Section 2.6.
Finally, we will conclude in Section 2.7.
2.1.1 Related works
There is a large theoretical literature, beginning with the seminal paper on the email
game by Rubinstein (1989), showing that higher-order beliefs play a role in determin-
ing the outcome of a game. For instance, Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) use higher-
order beliefs (in their model of global games) to identify the risk-dominant equilibrium
as the unique rationalizable outcome of the coordination game. This uniqueness result
4A brief overview of some models of higher-order beliefs can be found in Section 2.1.1 and a more
detailed discussion in Section 2.9.
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spawned a large applied literature on, among other areas, bank runs and arms races,
in e.g. Morris and Shin (1998), Morris and Shin (2004), Baliga and Sjöström (2004),
Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004), and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). We-
instein and Yildiz (2007b), however, have shown that this uniqueness result, that this
whole literature depends on, is fragile to the exact speciﬁcation of the higher-order
belief model. Other nearby higher-order belief models have very diﬀerent unique
predictions. In fact, they show that any rationalizable outcome of the original game,
can be obtained as the unique rationalizable strategy proﬁle of some higher-order belief
model.
Weinstein and Yildiz (2007a) establish a condition, called global stability under un-
certainty. This condition implies that, if the change in equilibrium actions is small
in the change of kth-order beliefs and higher, equilibria can be approximated by the
equilibrium with at most kth-order beliefs. Unfortunately, pure coordination games do
not fulﬁll global stability under uncertainty.
Strzalecki (2014) and Kneeland (2016) develop diﬀerent non-equilibrium approaches,
inspired by the experimental literature discussed later, using bounded levels of reason-
ing to explain behavior in coordinated attack problems (e.g. Rubinstein's (1989) email
game).
A more in-depth discussion of models of higher-order beliefs and their predictions of
the results of our experiment can be found in Section 2.9.
The experimental literature, however, has so far mostly focused on strategic uncer-
tainty. The most prominent example for this is probably the literature on level-k
thinking or cognitive hierarchy models, which was started by Nagel (1995) and Stahl
and Wilson (1995). In recent years, there have been many studies conducted, using
and analyzing level-k reasoning, for example Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998), Costa-
Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001), Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) and Crawford,
Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008). For a recent survey, see Crawford, Costa-Gomes,
and Iriberri (2013).
But there also have been works which do not focus on strategic uncertainty. For
example Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004), Cornand (2006), Cabrales, Nagel,
and Armenter (2007) and Duﬀy and Ochs (2012) who directly test implications of the
theory of global games, i.e. individuals play an incomplete information game as in
Carlsson and Van Damme (1993). The results however, are mixed and range from full
support to full rejection of the predictions made by global games.
Another, closely related work is Kneeland (2015), in which she explores the level of
rationality, a requirement for higher-order beliefs, of players experimentally. She shows
that, in her experiment, 94% of all players are rational with decreasing numbers for
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second- (71%), third- (44%) and forth-order (22%) rationality.
We explore experimentally the depth of reasoning individuals employ when playing
slightly diﬃcult coordination games. In fact we want to abstract away from purely
strategic concerns by only looking at coordination games in which the incentives of
the players are perfectly aligned and a Pareto-dominant equilibrium exists. The fun-
damental uncertainty in the model will be one about the cognitive abilities of the
opponents.
Diﬀerences in cognitive abilities have been studied before, for example by Gill and
Prowse (2016), who have shown that more cognitively able subjects converge, in re-
peated p-beauty contests, more frequently to equilibrium play and earn more. Further-
more, Proto, Rustichini, and Soﬁanos (2014) have shown that intelligence aﬀects the
results of repeatedly played prisoner's dilemmas, in which groups of higher intelligence
tend to cooperate more frequently in later stages of the game. Agranov, Potamites,
Schotter, and Tergiman (2012) have shown, by manipulating the perception of the
cognitive levels of other players, that beliefs about the level of reasoning do play a sig-
niﬁcant role in the presence of strategic uncertainty. Alaoui and Penta (2015) establish
a framework in which the depth of reasoning is endogenously determined by diﬀerent
cognitive costs of reasoning.
The way we model cognitive diﬀerences however, builds on another branch of literature.
Motivated by Schelling's (1960) discussion of focal points, a variety of authors have tried
to formally capture his ideas, most notably Bacharach (1993) and Sugden (1995). The
importance of focal points is supported by many experiments, for example by Mehta,
Starmer, and Sugden (1994), who have replicated Schelling's results and have shown
that coordinating on a focal point is diﬀerent from accidental coordination. Crawford,
Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008) have shown that, in a pure coordination game with
symmetric payoﬀs, salient labels lead to a high percentage of coordination whereas
even slight asymmetries in payoﬀs might lead to a coordination failure. Isoni, Poulsen,
Sugden, and Tsutsui (2013) extend the analysis to bargaining problems and show that
payoﬀ-irrelevant clues help to improve coordination, even if there is no eﬃcient or equal
division.
In the absence of clues however, the theory of focal points can not be applied. Formally,
the absence of clues can be modeled as symmetries between strategies and players in
a given game. In fact Nash (1951), has already discussed equilibrium under symmetry
restrictions (and shown existence also of such symmetric (mixed) equilibria for ﬁnite
games). Crawford and Haller (1990) have deﬁned symmetries in games and used these
deﬁnitions to see what focal points in highly symmetric repeated coordination games
9
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would look like.5 Blume (2000) has further developed this symmetry concept to talk
about play under the absence of a common language. Other notions of symmetries
have been put forward and studied in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Casajus (2000)
and Casajus (2001). Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2013) have then clariﬁed the diﬀerence
between diﬀerent notions of symmetries and characterized all the possible ways a frame
(the way a game is presented to players in the lab, for instance) could lead to diﬀerent
symmetry restrictions (and therefore to diﬀerent focal points).
All these models of symmetries and restrictions are implicitly or explicitly investigated
under the assumption of perfectly rational individuals. However, identifying all sym-
metries (and especially non-symmetries) in a game can be a diﬃcult task. Bacharach
(1993) has proposed his variable frame theory to allow for individual players with dif-
ferent states of mind or, as developed by Blume (2000) and employed by Blume and
Gneezy (2000) and Blume and Gneezy (2010), with diﬀerent cognitive abilities.
This ﬁnally brings us to the goal of our study. We want to take up the experimental
results and setup of Blume and Gneezy (2010), in which there is an issue of cognitive
diﬃculties, to analyze the eﬀects of higher-order beliefs. Blume and Gneezy (2010)
were able to show that participants form beliefs about the cognitive abilities of other
participants and, if these beliefs are pessimistic, they hinder coordination between the
players. However, they have not taken into account the eﬀect of higher-order beliefs
about cognitive abilities. Therefore, we modify their experimental setup in order to
distinguish the eﬀect of ﬁrst-order beliefs players form about the cognitive ability of
their opponents (i.e., if players trust in the cognitive ability of their partners) and
higher-order beliefs.
2.2 Example
In this example, players only have access to two strategies l and h and are trying to
coordinate on one of them; the payoﬀs are as depicted in the payoﬀ matrix in Figure 2.1.
As (h, h) has a higher equilibrium payment it would therefore be the focal point (and
the risk- and payoﬀ-dominant Nash equilibrium) of this particular game.6
However, if we introduce cognitive diﬀerences, i.e., if action h is only available to a
high-cognition player and low-cognition players are forced to play l, beliefs about the
5Bhaskar (2000) and more comprehensively Kuzmics, Palfrey, and Rogers (2014), have studied
theoretically and in the latter case also experimentally, what the possible focal points of the symmetric
repeated battle-of-the-sexes and its generalizations could be.
6Or, in the words of Luce and Raiﬀa (1957) and Schelling (1960) a solution in the strict sense.
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l h
l 1,1 0,0
h 0,0 3,3
Figure 2.1: Payoﬀ matrix of a high-cognition player
other player's type might lead to coordination failure,7 even if both players are high-
cognition players. The driving force of this result is the absence of common knowledge
about the players' type or the fraction of high cognition players.
The following two examples show how beliefs could lead to coordination failure between
two high-cognition players: First imagine that the ﬁrst player (she) thinks that the
other player (he) is a low-cognition player. Then she would play l, as he would have
no other choice than playing l. This is what we will call coordination failure due to a
ﬁrst-order belief. The second example is that she thinks that his type is high, he thinks
she is a high-type player but she thinks that he thinks her type is low. Again, she would
play l as she thinks that he will play l. Here we have a coordination problem due to her
second-order belief. Therefore, even if both players have the ability to coordinate on
the best equilibrium, they might end up failing to coordinate on the better equilibrium
(h, h).
The existence of inﬁnitely many levels of beliefs and that a bad belief at any level
makes the player switch to the bad strategy l makes one wonder, if, even with a
high fraction of high-cognition players, coordination on the good equilibrium (h, h) is
possible.
Therefore, the ﬁrst main question this chapter addresses is if coordination on the good
equilibrium can be expected even in the absence of common knowledge. The second
question is if systematic underestimation of other players' skills can be a source of
coordination failure, or if ﬁrst-order beliefs matter. The third and last question is if
higher-order beliefs, e.g. if she thinks that he thinks that she is a low type, are a
possible cause for coordination failure or if these levels of reasoning are too complex
and play no signiﬁcant role in coordination games.
The concepts of coordination games and higher-order beliefs will be formalized in the
following section.
7In this chapter, we follow the notion for coordination failure of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil
(1990), i.e., the failure to coordinate on the best achievable outcome. That means, even if two
high-cognition players coordinate on a Pareto-inferior equilibrium we will call it coordination failure.
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2.3 The model
We begin by deﬁning a pure coordination game for two players.
Deﬁnition 1 (Pure coordination game). A pure coordination game is a game with 2
players, who each have access to m diﬀerent actions ({a1, a2, . . . , am}).
In this game payoﬀs of a player i are deﬁned as
ui(ai, aj) =
xi ∀i, j : i = j0 otherwise
with xm > xm−1 > · · · > x1.
This means that each player can choose from the same set of actions and whenever
they have picked the same action they get the same payoﬀ and if they don't manage to
coordinate their actions, both get nothing. Furthermore, there is a Pareto ordering of
these equilibria. Figure 2.2 shows an example of a pure coordination game with three
possible actions.
a1 a2 a3
a1 1, 1 0,0 0,0
a2 0,0 2, 2 0,0
a3 0,0 0,0 4, 4
Figure 2.2: A pure coordination game
Let us now introduce cognitive diﬀerences into this pure coordination game. For the
sake of simplicity, we are only introducing two cognitive types, a low-cognitive type
and a high-cognitive type. The latter has access to a better strategy, which is not
available to the low type. Furthermore, the low type is unaware of the existence of the
high type, as proposed by Bacharach (1993).
Deﬁnition 2 (Pure coordination game with cognitive diﬀerences). A pure coordination
game with cognitive diﬀerences is a game with 2 players. Each of the players has a
type ti ∈ {low, high} and has access to diﬀerent strategies, depending on his type ti.
The types of a player are her private information. Low cognition players have access
to {a1, a2, . . . , am−1} whereas high cognition players also have access to the action am,
i.e., to {a1, a2, . . . , am}.
In this game payoﬀs of a player i are deﬁned as
ui(ai, aj) =
xi ∀i, j : i = j0 otherwise
with xm > xm−1 ≥ · · · ≥ x1.
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These cognitive diﬀerences can also be thought of as symmetry constraints on attainable
strategies, as proposed by Crawford and Haller (1990) and further developed by Blume
(2000) and Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2013). Here, the high-cognition player has less
symmetry constrains and has therefore more attainable strategies.
In the experiment we are using the notion of cognitive diﬀerences as proposed by
Blume and Gneezy (2010) (a generalization of Bacharach's variable frame theory, using
diﬀerent symmetry constraints on the attainable strategies as used in Blume (2000)).
For a formal description of the belief hierarchy of these games, we would like to refer
to Section 2.8.1. However, we believe for understanding the results of this work, the
idea conveyed in Section 2.2 should suﬃce.
2.4 Hypotheses
Before investigating the three original research questions, we will have a look at some
preliminaries. First, we expect Nash equilibria and, if these equilibria can be Pareto-
ranked, the Pareto-better equilibrium to be played in the pure coordination game. This
is supported by the literature (e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) or Cooper,
DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1990)) and was also corroborated by the choice data of
the experiment. For low-cognition player that means that the Pareto-dominant action
am−1 will be chosen over all other actions, as, for him, the game is a simple pure
coordination game, because he does not know about the existence of the high type.
The high-cognition player, however, has two valid options: am and am−1. As we have
seen in the example, the answer to the question if the high-cognition player chooses the
payoﬀ-dominant strategy am or the second-best strategy am−1, depends on her beliefs.
We have chosen the game in such a way that the fraction of high-cognition players is
high enough (i.e., > xm
xm−1+xm
), so that playing am is the payoﬀ-dominant strategy.
Unfortunately, neither the theoretical nor the experimental literature on higher-order
beliefs can tell us which of the two will be chosen. Even small variations in the theoret-
ical models of higher-order beliefs can generate both equilibria. Table 2.1 shows us the
predictions of a few common models of higher-order beliefs for the game as described
in Section 2.3. The derivation of these predictions and a more detailed discussion can
be found in Section 2.9.
From the table we can see that even the question if there is coordination in this game
depends very much on the model of higher-order beliefs.
Hypothesis 1 (Coordination is possible). High-cognition players use the ﬁrst-best
strategy am which is not available to the low-cognition players, despite the absence
13
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Model Coordination First-order be-
lief coordination
problems
Higher-order be-
lief coordination
problems
Common
knowledge
Full coordination No No
Common
p-belief
Full coordination No No
Global games No coordination Yes Yes
Almost com-
mon knowl-
edge
No coordination No Yes.
Table 2.1: Models of higher-order beliefs
of common knowledge about the cognitive types.
The next two hypotheses extend on Blume and Gneezy's (2010) hypothesis that beliefs
matter: Hypothesis 2 formalizes the question Does coordination fail because some
high-cognition players underestimate the fraction of high-cognition players? .
Hypothesis 2 (First-order beliefs matter). There is coordination failure due to ﬁrst-
order beliefs.
Most of the problems in models of higher-order beliefs stem from the fact that there
are inﬁnitely many levels of beliefs. However, evidence from the laboratory indicates
that people are not able to use higher-order rationality,8 a requirement for coordination
problems due to higher-order beliefs. Furthermore, even in studies of level-k reasoning,
where players are framed and incentivized on using higher-order beliefs, players still
rarely use high-levels of reasoning.9
Hypothesis 3 (Higher-order beliefs matter). There is coordination failure due to
higher-order beliefs.
In the following section we are going to explain the experimental design to test the
three hypothesis.
8Kneeland (2015) shows that only about 22% of all players use more than third-order rationality.
9In Arad and Rubinstein's (2012) 11-20 game, 80 % of the players only use 3rd-order beliefs or
lower despite the game being designed to facilitate higher-order reasoning.
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Figure 2.3: 5-sector-disc
2.5 Experimental design
Measuring higher-order beliefs is very complicated, as there is an uncertainty prin-
ciple (as already discussed by Blume and Gneezy (2010)) at work; i.e., it is hard to
measure beliefs without introducing or changing them.10 Introducing absence of com-
mon knowledge is diﬃcult. When told that they are given a random number, subjects
usually assume that it is drawn from a uniform distribution. Explicitly stating that the
distribution is unknown leads to a myriad of other problems. Subjects could for exam-
ple assume a strategic selection of the distribution by the experimenter. Furthermore,
we need to have some sort of control over the fraction of high-cognition players, so
that the action only available to the high-cognition players is the one with the highest
expected payoﬀ (see Section 2.9).
We solve all three problems by utilizing Blume and Gneezy's (2000) 5-sector disc. This
is a disc with 5 equally large sectors on it, 2 black and 3 white, as depicted in Fig-
ure 2.3.11 The disc has the same sectors on the front- and backside of the disc and can
be ﬂipped and rotated. As the disc can be ﬂipped, the subjects face symmetry con-
straints and can therefore not distinguish all ﬁve sectors. These symmetries cannot be
overcome and therefore not all Nash equilibria are possible given the particular frame.
Only certain attainable equilibria are possible, as deﬁned originally in Crawford and
Haller (1990), and further developed by Blume (2000) and Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics
(2013).
The property of this disc which is most important for this chapter is that it has a single
distinct white sector: The sector adjacent to both black sectors (Figure 2.3).12
10Either by making the subjects realize that there might be something like a higher-order belief or
by them trying to be a good subject (Orne (1962)).
11There is a second version of this disc, with a signiﬁcantly harder to ﬁnd distinct sector, with
adjacent black sectors. However, for this disc, the fraction of players who were able to identify the
distinct sector is too small.
12More about the properties of this disc can be found in Blume and Gneezy (2000).
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For the subjects there are then, in principle, three distinguishable sets of sectors: the
black sectors (B), the uniquely identiﬁable white sector (D), and the other white sec-
tors (W').
The key assumption behind the experiment (and also behind Blume and Gneezy (2000)
and Blume and Gneezy (2010) and very much supported by their ﬁndings), is that not
all subjects realize that there is a uniquely identiﬁable sector, which leads to two dif-
ferent cognitive types, the high type, who can identify the distinct sector, and the low
type, who cannot. The low type then faces an additional symmetry constrain and has
only two distinguishable sectors to choose from: One of the two black sectors (B) or
one of the three white sectors (W).
The subjects then played three treatments in a random order without feedback after
hearing and reading the instructions and completing an extensive quiz:13
The Self Treatment in which the subject gets the disc twice, every time randomly
turned and rotated, and gets ¿5 if she picks the same sector twice.
In the Prediction Treatment one subject (she) is told that another subject (he)
plays the Self Treatment (with a possibly diﬀerently turned and rotated disc). She has
to pick one sector and every time he picks the sector she picked, she gets ¿2.5.
Finally, the Coordination Treatment, in which two players pick simultaneously a
sector on a (randomly turned and rotated) disc and, if both players pick the same
sector, both receive ¿5.
2.5.1 Hypotheses
In the Self Treatment a high-cognition player has 9 possible choices: She can pick any
of three actions (D,B,W') in the ﬁrst stage and then pick any of the three actions in
the second stage. This decision problem for the high-cognition player has a unique
optimal solution: pick the distinct sector twice, giving her a probability to win of 1.
A low-cognition player is only aware of four possible choices: He can pick B or W in
the ﬁrst stage and then pick B or W in the second stage. The low-cognition player
also has a unique optimal choice: pick B in both stages, giving him a probability to
win of 1
2
.
Therefore, we would expect a high-cognition player to choose the distinct sector twice
and a low-cognition player to pick a black sector twice.
In the Prediction Treatment, the action taken by a subject should only depend on
her type and her ﬁrst-order belief about the type of the other player. A low-cognition
player will always choose B, whereas a risk-neutral, high-cognition player should pick D
13For the complete instructions and a description of the quiz see the Sections 2.9.3 and 2.9.4.
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if his belief that the other player is also of the high type is at least 1
3
and B otherwise.14
The coordination treatment is best depicted as a bi-matrix game with three (for the
high-cognition player) and two (for the low-cognition player) pure strategies, with
winning probabilities as depicted in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5. We expect a low-
cognition player to play B, as it is the payoﬀ- and risk-dominant equilibrium, whereas
a high-cognition player's choice depends on her belief hierarchy: If anywhere in her
complete hierarchy a belief lower than 1
3
(or 1
2
for very risk averse players) that the
other player is a high-cognition player or that the other player thinks that she is a
high-cognition player, . . . (or, in short, that there is no common-p belief of 1
3
or higher,
that both players are high-cognition players), she will choose B, otherwise she will
choose D.
W ′ B D
W ′ 1
2
0 0
B 0 1
2
0
D 0 0 1
Figure 2.4: High-cognition player win-
ning probabilities
W B
W 1
3
0
B 0 1
2
Figure 2.5: Low-cognition player win-
ning probabilities
We are using a within-subject design to test the hypotheses as stated in Section 2.4. In
the following we will use a shorthand for players' strategies: "W'W' B D" means that
a player selected one of the two white sectors twice in the Self Treatment, one of the
black sectors in the Prediction Treatment and the distinct sector in the Coordination
Treatment.
Using our design, we can reformulate the hypotheses as stated in Section 2.3:
Hypothesis 1 (Coordination is possible). High-cognition players choose in the Coor-
dination Treatment D more often than any other choice.
The idea is straight forward: Only high-cognition players can identify the best equi-
librium, so we don't have to consider other types. We can identify these players with
the help of the the Self Treatment. If high-cognition players, i.e., the ones who have
been able to identify D in the Self Treatment, coordinate on D in the Coordina-
tion Treatment we know that coordination is possible, even in the absence of common
knowledge.
The second question we want to answer is, if pessimistic beliefs about the other players'
14Allowing for risk-averse players, this fraction has to be between 13 and
1
2 , depending on the degree
of risk aversion.
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types can lead to coordination failure.
Hypothesis 2 (First-order beliefs matter). There are high-cognition subjects who
choose a black sector in the Prediction Treatment and Cooperation Treatment, i.e.,
play DD B B.
We already know that we can identify players' types with the help of the Self Treatment.
Furthermore, the Prediction Treatment identiﬁes players who think that more than 1
3
of the other players can not identify the distinct sector.
Hypothesis 3 (Higher-order beliefs matter). There are high-cognition subjects who
play the distinct sector in the Prediction Treatment and a black sector in the Coopera-
tion Treatment, i.e., play DD D B.
Our design allows for another robustness check: There is an attainable strategy which
is very similar to the one we use to identify ﬁrst- and higher-order beliefs: DD B D.
This strategy will only be chosen if players belief that their partner is of the low type,
but still plays D in the in the Coordination Treatment. This strategy can therefore
not be explained using our model.
Hypothesis (Robustness check). DD B D is played less often than DD B B and
DD D B.
2.6 Results
The experiment was conducted at the DR@W Laboratory at the University of War-
wick using the experimental software "z-Tree" developed by Fischbacher (2007). 130
subjects where recruited and received payments between ¿3 and ¿18. Before showing
the results, let us brieﬂy discuss the preliminaries of the experiment design.
The ﬁrst preliminary is the focality of the distinct and the two black sectors. From the
choice data in Figure 2.6 we can see that more than 95% of all players have chosen one
of these sectors in the Coordination Treatment. The second preliminary is that there
are enough high-cognition players, so that playing the high-cognition exclusive action
is a payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium for the players. In Figure 2.7 we can see that 58% of
all players have chosen the distinct sector and are therefore considered high-cognition
players. Therefore, playing the distinct sector would maximize the expected utility of
high-cognition players in a game with common knowledge about the type distribution,
independently of the degree of risk aversion (see Section 2.9).
These results are in line with Blume and Gneezy's (2010) results where around 52%
(58% in our experiment) have been able to identify the distinct sector and around
23% (34%) have chosen the black sector. We contribute the signiﬁcantly lower level of
18
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Figure 2.6: Results of the Coordination Treatment
noise (8% vs 25%) to the extensive instructions and the quiz we conducted before the
experiment.15
Due to the lower level of noise we are, unlike Blume and Gneezy (2010), able to use
a within-subject design, in which each player has access to 625 possible strategies.16
Of these strategies we consider 96.32% as noise.17 As the number of strategies which
support our hypothesis are very low (1, 4 and 2 out of 625), the probability that
someone chooses them by mistake is very low. For a detailed overview of all possible
strategies and how we categorize them see Table 2.2.
Given the preliminaries, we can test hypotheses 1 through 3.
Hypothesis 1 (Coordination is possible). High-cognition players choose in the coor-
dination treatment D more often than any other choice.
The choice data from our experiment conﬁrms this hypothesis. In Figure 2.8 we can
see that 80% have chosen the strategy DD D D. As this strategy represents only
0.16% of all available strategies (or 4% when excluding the Self Treatment), we can
reject the null hypothesis of this high level of coordination being a result of random
15For the instructions and an overview of the quiz see the Sections 2.9.3 and 2.9.4.
16We are here ignoring the order in which treatments are played.
17This noise includes not only players not understanding the experiment or behaving randomly but
also Eureka-learning (which was a big problem in Blume and Gneezy (2010), see Section 2.9.1),
making a mistake (e.g., picking a not distinct white sector instead of the distinct sector, a mistake,
which both of the authors made multiple times while testing the experiment) and beliefs of low-
cognition players.
19
CHAPTER 2. HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS AND COORDINATION FAILURE
D
is
ti
n
ct
se
ct
o
r
B
la
ck
se
ct
o
r
W
h
it
e
se
ct
o
r
O
th
er
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
%
Figure 2.7: Results of the Self Treatment
Description Hypothesis # of strategies Proportion
DD D D 1: Coordination is possible 1 0.16%
DD B B 2: First-order beliefs matter 4 0.64%
DD D B 3: Higher-order beliefs matter 2 0.32%
BB B B (Low-cognition players) 16 2.56%
Noise - 602 96.32%
WW-W-W (part of Noise) 80 12.80%
Table 2.2: Overview of the strategies
play (p < 0.00001).
Blume and Gneezy (2010) claim that beliefs matter and we test in Hypothesis 2
if there are subjects whose pessimistic beliefs about the other players' skills lead to
coordination failure.
Hypothesis 2 (First-order beliefs matter). There are high-cognition subjects who
choose a black sector in the Prediction Treatment and Cooperation Treatment, i.e.,
play DD B B.
Our data conﬁrms this hypothesis. Figure 2.9 shows us the results of all players,
Figure 2.10 of the high-cognition players. In these ﬁgures we can see that about 9%
of the high-cognition players (or 5% of all players) have a ﬁrst-order belief problem,
leading to coordination failure. As the fraction of strategies leading to this conclusion
20
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Figure 2.8: Results of the Coordination Treatment (high-cognition players)
is very small (0.64%) we can reject the null hypothesis that this result is due to chance
(p < 0.00001).
But do players really use higher-order beliefs in this type of games? Hypothesis 3 tests
for this question.
Hypothesis 3 (Higher-order beliefs matter). There are high-cognition subjects who
play the distinct sector in the Prediction Treatment and a black sector in the Coopera-
tion Treatment, i.e., play DD D B.
From Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 we can see that there are high-cognition players who
think that their partner is with a high probability of the high type, they, however, still
think there are coordination problems. Again, we can reject the null hypothesis at the
1% level (p < 0.00001).
Hypothesis (Robustness check). DD B D is played less often than DD B B and
DD D B.
All these results are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, however, our design allows
for another robustness check: There is a strategy which should not be played by rational
players: DD B D, which is about as likely to be picked at random as DD B B and
DD D B but can not be explained by our model. Figure 2.11, shows us that only 2
subjects have chosen this strategy.
We expected to have signiﬁcant order eﬀects, as in Blume and Gneezy (2010). However,
it turns out, that the only robust order eﬀect is a weak eﬀect in the Self Treatment
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Figure 2.10: Used strategies (high-cognition players)
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Figure 2.11: Robustness check
(i.e., more subjects have been able to choose the distinct sector twice later in the ex-
periment).18 We attribute this to a small change in design. We have explained every
treatment before the experiment started and we have conducted a quiz (Section 2.9.4),
testing if the instructions have been understood. This probably lead to Eureka learn-
ing before instead of during the experiment.
2.7 Conclusion
We have seen that, in this game, absence of common knowledge was not enough to
prevent coordination on the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, as 76% of the high-cognition
players have chosen the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. However, we still have a fraction
of players who have beliefs that lead to coordination failure (around 18%) and of these
only half could be attributed to ﬁrst-order beliefs.
Of the models of higher-order beliefs discussed in Section 2.4 and Section 2.9, only
assuming common knowledge or a common p-belief were able to explain coordination
on the payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium. However, these assumptions can not explain any
coordination failure due to beliefs, as the beliefs are ﬁxed by the model, whereas the
models which can explain this type of coordination failure predict no coordination on
the payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium.
18For the full analysis of order eﬀects see Section 2.9.1.
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Therefore, as we have observed a coordination rate of about 76%, assuming common
knowledge (or a common p-belief) might be the best tractable approximation available
in coordination games without common knowledge, depending on the focus of the
research.
But coming back to the example mentioned in the introduction, ignoring the higher-
order beliefs can have severe negative consequences. Our results can explain why
education without considering problems due to higher-order beliefs can have signiﬁcant
eﬀect but they can also explain why NGOs like Tostan have signiﬁcantly more success.
Furthermore, these results give reason to belief that just explaining if others have
been educated and are against female genital mutilation (i.e., changing the ﬁrst-order
beliefs) might not be suﬃcient and making this education common knowledge might
be necessary to achieve all possible beneﬁts from it.
However, the results from this experiment conducted with students at a European
university should of course not be generalized to explain behavior in small rural com-
munities without further research but just gives us reason to belief that higher-order
beliefs do matter.
This opens up some questions for future research: Can these results be generalized
to other populations? Are there certain parts of the populations who are more likely
to exhibit ﬁrst- or higher-order beliefs which lead to coordination failure? Are there
other, maybe easier methods to make something common knowledge? Furthermore,
it might be worthwhile to check more general structures of higher-order beliefs or
if non-equilibrium models like Strzalecki (2014) or Kneeland (2016) can explain this
phenomenon better.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Belief hierarchies
Let B0i := Tj and B
k
i = Tj × ∆(Bk−1i ) with ∆ (B) being the space of probability
measures on B and ∆(X) being the space of probability measures on the Borel ﬁeld
of X, endowed with the weak topology. Using this notation, we can deﬁne a belief
hierarchy as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 (Belief hierarchy). A k-th order belief is deﬁned as
bki ∈ ∆(Bki )
with B0i = Tj and B
k
j = Tj × ∆(Bk−1j ). Furthermore, let us set b0i := ti. A belief
hierarchy of a player i is then b = {b0i , b1i , . . . .}
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We therefore have a ﬁrst order belief b1i ∈ ∆({low, high}) = [0, 1] and higher-order
beliefs bki ∈ [0, 1]k.
Furthermore, we assume these beliefs to be coherent, i.e., that beliefs of diﬀerent orders
do not contradict one another,19 and that a low-cognition type does not know about
higher cognitive types, i.e., bki = 0⇒ bk+1i = 0 ∀k ≥ 0.
This excludes, on the one hand, that a low-cognition player thinks that the other player
is a high-cognition player and, on the other hand, that a player has a ﬁrst-order belief
that the other player is of a the high type and a higher-order belief that the player is
of the low type.
2.9 Equilibrium selection and models of higher-
order beliefs
In this section we are going to discuss how diﬀerent models of beliefs and frequently
used assumptions on the structure of higher-order beliefs inﬂuence the speciﬁc game
we analyze.
Using the results from the literature on focal points in coordination games (as discussed
in Section 2.1.1), we know that we can restrict our attention on the two actions with
the highest payoﬀs am−1 and am. This simpliﬁes the game to a Bayesian game with
two types, a low type whose only attainable action is am−1 and a high type, who has
access to am−1 and am, without common knowledge about the type distribution. Then,
we can denote, with a small abuse of notation, the strategy of a player as the action
she chooses if she is of the high-type, i.e., am or am−1, knowing that she will play am−1
if she is of the low type.
Let us ﬁrst start with the most common assumption, that the distribution of types is
common knowledge. Then the expected utility of a (risk neutral) high-cognition player
is as depicted in Table 2.3, given her and her partners strategies.20 p denotes the
probability of a player being of the high type. We can see that the prediction of the
model then depends on p. If the probability of a player being of the high type p is
too low (p < xm−1
xm−1+xm
), only (am−1, am−1) will be an equilibrium. In this chapter we
are going to assume that p ≥ xm−1
xm−1+xm
which makes sure that the better equilibrium
19I.e., higher-order beliefs of a player mapped onto the space of beliefs of a lower order are the same.
20In the analysis we restrict our attention to risk-neutral players. However, the analysis for the case
of risk-averse players is analogous and the experimental results are valid for every possible degree of
risk aversion.
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always exists.21 For risk-averse players, it is required that p ≥ u(xm−1)
u(xm−1)+u(xm)
, so we
know that as long as p ≥ 1
2
the high-type equilibrium always exists, independently of
the degree of risk aversion. Furthermore, if the equilibrium exists, it is payoﬀ dominant.
am−1 am
am−1 xm−1, xm−1 (1− p)xm−1, 0
am 0, (1− p)xm−1 pxm, pxm
Table 2.3: Expected utilities of two high-cognition players
Therefore, the prediction of assuming that the distribution of types is common knowl-
edge is that, for a high-enough p, we should expect full cooperation.
Monderer and Samet's (1989) common p-belief is a generalization of the concept of
common knowledge and generates, in this model, the same predictions as assuming
that the distribution of types is common knowledge, given a high-enough p.
The game we are analyzing is very close to the original description of a global game
as introduced by Carlsson and Van Damme (1993). Written down as in Table 2.3
it is a very similar game as the main example used in Carlsson and Van Damme
(1993). Therefore, we know that, given xm−1
xm
≤ p ≤ 2xm−1
xm+xm−1
(i.e., (am, am) is still
a Nash equilibrium but (am−1, am−1) is risk dominant), (am−1, am−1) will be the only
rationalizable solution to the global game. Furthermore, Hellwig (2002) shows that
higher-order uncertainty about preferences leads to results similar to Carlsson and
Van Damme's (1993) higher-order uncertainty about payoﬀs, i.e., coordination on the
"less risky" equilibrium.
Rubinstein (1989) shows that truncating common knowledge at any ﬁnite level is equiv-
alent to the situation without any common knowledge at all and therefore suggests that
players choose the save strategy am−1.
Weinstein and Yildiz (2007a) establish a condition, called global stability under uncer-
tainty which implies that the change in equilibrium actions is small in the change of
kth-order beliefs and higher. Therefore, under this condition, equilibria can be approx-
imated by the equilibrium with lower-order beliefs. Unfortunately, pure coordination
games do, in general, not fulﬁll the conditions for global stability under uncertainty
as the best responses are very sensitive to every order of beliefs and even a small change
in some higher-order belief might make a player change from am to am−1.
21In the experiment this assumption requires p > 13 . As the fraction of high-cognition players is
58%, this assumption is not problematic.
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Model Coordination First-order be-
lief coordination
problems
Higher-order be-
lief coordination
problems
Common
knowledge
Full coordination No No
Common
p-belief
Full coordination No No
Global games No coordination Yes Yes
Almost com-
mon knowl-
edge
No coordination No Yes.
Table 2.4: Models of higher-order beliefs
2.9.1 Order eﬀects
In the introduction we have brieﬂy discussed an uncertainty principle, in which higher-
order beliefs can not be measured without inducing them. This theory is a related
to the good subjects hypothesis (Orne (1962)) according to which some subjects try
to ﬁgure out the research question and then change their behavior to conﬁrm said
hypothesis. However, in this case the diﬀerence is more subtle: As soon as they realize
that there is a higher-order belief problem, they might overestimate it.
Blume and Gneezy (2010) have encountered a diﬀerent case of this uncertainty hy-
pothesis. Having a player play against himself may trigger an insight that switches a
player from low to high cognition ("Eureka!" learning). There may be an uncertainly
principle at work here in that we cannot measure a player's cognition without altering
it. (Blume and Gneezy (2010)) This suggests, that the order of treatments might be
important. Therefore, we implemented a random order. However, it turns out that we
have (almost) no order eﬀect, as can be seen in Table 2.5. The only statistically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect is that, if the self treatment was the ﬁrst treatment, there was a signiﬁcantly
higher number of Other results than when it was the second (p = 0.0062) or third
treatment (p = 0.0139). Furthermore, the distinct sector was played more often in
the coordination treatment if it was the second than the ﬁrst treatment (p = 0.0277),
however, there were no signiﬁcant eﬀects when comparing the ﬁrst and third and the
second and third.22The former has a intuitive explanation (i.e., practicing the task
makes it less likely to make a mistake) whereas the later is considered to be a type II
error by the authors.
22Using the one-tailed Fisher's exact test.
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Treatment Self Prediction Coordination
Order DD BB Other D B W D B W
1st 18 10 8 23 15 3 22 22 3
2nd 32 24 2 20 16 2 24 10 0
3rd 25 10 1 32 15 4 23 15 5
Table 2.5: Order eﬀects of the diﬀerent treatments
The question now is, why did Blume and Gneezy (2010) encounter strong "Eureka!"-
learning eﬀects whereas we had (almost) no signiﬁcant eﬀect. The authors attribute
this to the fact that we used more extensive instructions and a quiz to make sure the
instructions where understood. More importantly, the participants were instructed in
all three treatments before they played the ﬁrst game which most likely triggered the
learning before the ﬁrst decision, whereas in Blume and Gneezy (2010) the instructions
for the second treatment were distributed after completion of the ﬁrst treatment.
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2.9.2 Data
Self Guessing Coordination
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
Self Guessing Coordination
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D B
D D D B
D D D B
D D D B
D D D B
D D D B
D D D B
D D B D
D D B D
D D B B
D D B B
D D B B
D D B B
D D B B
D D B B
D D B B
D D W D
D D W W
D B D D
B B D D
B B D D
B B D B
B B D B
B B D B
B B D B
B B D B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
Self Guessing Coordination
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B W
B B B W
B B W D
B B W B
B W D D
B W B B
W B W D
W W D D
W W D D
W W B D
W W W B
W W W W
W W W W
W W W W
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2.9.3 Instructions
Welcome to this experiment in economic decision making. It will take approximately
60 minutes. First of all, please check that the number on the card handed to you
matches the number on the cubicle that you are seated in and that your mobile phones
are turned oﬀ.
Before we start, we will explain the rules of this experiment. You will also ﬁnd these
rules on the paper provided, so you can read along and check again during the experi-
ment. If you have any questions, please do not speak up but raise your hand and we
will come to you and answer your question privately.
From now on, please do not talk, and listen carefully. In this experiment you will earn
a minimum of £3, and potentially up to £18. How much money you earn will depend
on your decisions and those of the other participants. Your reward will be paid out at
the end of the experiment. None of the other participants will know how much money
you made.
In this experiment you will be asked to make decisions related to a disc that has 5
sectors, similar to the disc provided to you. The disc has two identical sides. Your goal
will be to pick the same sector twice (more on that later). During this experiment the
disc will be ﬂipped and/or rotated randomly.
Pictures on page 2 illustrate rotation and ﬂipping. Since you will not be told if the
disc was ﬂipped and/or rotated, it might even be the case that disc looks exactly the
same though sectors have changed their positions.
The arrow tracks one speciﬁc sector that changes its position as the disc is rotated
and/or ﬂipped.
This is an example of rotating the disc by two sectors:
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This is an example of ﬂipping the disc:
In the experiment the disc will be surrounded by the letters A, B, C, D, and E. These
labels are not part of the disc! They are only included to allow you to choose a
sector.
In the experiment you will make decisions in the following environments (the order will
be chosen randomly):
(Self Game) You will be asked to pick a sector twice; ﬁrst you choose a sector; then
the disc might be ﬂipped and/or rotated. After this you are shown the same disc and
have to choose a sector again. You will not observe the ﬂipping/rotation of the disc.
If you manage to guess the same sector twice, your payoﬀ will be £5. Otherwise, you
will receive 0. Therefore, to earn more money you want to maximise your chances to
pick the same sector twice.
Here is an example of the choices made in a Self Game, using a simpler disc with only
2 instead of 5 sectors:
First you picked the black sector; then you picked the black sector again. Therefore,
you pick the same sector twice and earn ¿5.
(Prediction Game) You are matched randomly with another person and you have
to guess the choice of this person, while she plays the Self Game. First, you choose
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a sector on the disc; each time the other person picks the sector you chose, you will
receive £2.5. As the other player picks twice in the Self Game, you can earn £0, £2.5
or £5 in this situation, depending on your and the other person's choice. Therefore,
to earn more money you want to guess what the other player is playing in the Self
Game described above.
Here is an example of the choices made in a Prediction Game, again with the simpler
disc:
First you picked the black sector. The other player then plays the Self Game. He
ﬁrst picks the black sector and therefore you earn £2.5. Then he picks the white sector
and therefore you earn £0. Thus you earn £2.5 in total.
(Coordination Game) You are matched randomly with another person and both of
you are asked to pick a sector on the disc simultaneously. Both of you know that you
play the Coordination Game. You both see the same disc but possibly diﬀerently
ﬂipped and rotated. If both of you pick the same sector, then your payoﬀ will be £5.
Otherwise, you will receive £0. Therefore, to earn more money you want to guess the
sector your partner is picking here, while he is trying to do the same.
Here is an example of the choices made in a Coordination Game, again with the
simpler disc.
You picked the black sector. The other player picked the white sector. You therefore
failed to coordinate and both of you earn £5 each.
The experiment consists of two periods. Each period consists of the three games as
described above, using a 5-sector disc; the order of the games is random. At the end
of the experiment one of the two periods will be randomly chosen. The earnings made
in this period will be paid out in cash.
Again, please do not talk during this experiment! If you have questions just raise your
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hand.
Before the experiment there will be a quiz to check your understanding. Read hints
carefully if you get stuck during the quiz.
2.9.4 Quiz
In this appendix you can ﬁnd screenshots of the quiz which was conducted before the
experiment. Participants who made a mistake in some part of the quiz were given a
small hint and then were asked to repeat this part of the quiz.
Figure 2.12: Quiz part 1
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Figure 2.13: Quiz part 2
Figure 2.14: Quiz part 3
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Figure 2.15: Quiz part 4
Figure 2.16: Quiz part 5
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Figure 2.17: Quiz part 6
Figure 2.18: Quiz part 7
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Figure 2.19: Quiz part 8
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Chapter 3
Rational Delay of Eﬀort in Projects
with Uncertain Requirements1
3.1 Introduction
You start doing it in school with your homework, continue while writing a term paper
in college and are probably still doing it when you have to do your taxes: You postpone
working on it until the very last minute, despite having a deadline. This phenomenon
is not restricted to work you conduct on your own, sometimes it is even stronger when
you work in a team.
Naturally this causes problems, not only for you, but for the whole team. In this chap-
ter I will focus on project work, i.e., working together towards a ﬁxed goal after which
your team will be terminated. Project work is generally said to be more eﬃcient and
is frequently used in the workplace (Harvard Business School Press (2004)) and the
classroom (Hutchinson (2001)).
Another important part of managing projects, apart from teamwork, is requirements
management. According to a survey by Taylor (2000) unclear objectives and require-
ments are the most common cause for failure of IT projects. In this chapter, I am
trying to establish a connection between uncertainty in the requirements of a projects
and the often observed last-minute rush, in which workers delay much of the required
work until the very end of the project.
This work proposes a continuous-time model of working in projects, which explains
delaying eﬀort not only in teams but also when working alone, not as a result of inef-
ﬁciency or time-inconsistency but as an eﬃcient, team-value maximizing consequence
1Parts of this chapter can be found in Külpmann (2015).
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of a deadline. The range of applications is quite broad, from large scale multi-national
research projects to a single worker trying to write a report.
The main features of this model are:
 public beneﬁts, which are realized upon completion of a project in the form of
a lump-sum payment,
 private costs, which are assumed to be quadratic,
 an unknown threshold for success or uncertain requirements, with a com-
monly known distribution,2
 unobservable eﬀorts, so only the player's own eﬀort is known,
 and a deadline, after which the project cannot be completed anymore.
In the model, the players exert eﬀort over time until either the deadline is reached
or the project is successful. While doing so, they only know that they have not been
successful yet. Projects in this model are described by the assumed distribution of
the breakthrough eﬀort. This breakthrough-eﬀort distribution can cover many diﬀerent
projects, e.g., projects in which only the current eﬀort inﬂuences the probability of
success or projects during which players learn about the quality of the project while
trying to complete it. One simple example for a breakthrough-eﬀort distribution is the
uniform distribution on [e, e]. This means that the players think that the project needs
eﬀort between e and e to be completed. For examples of diﬀerent types of projects and
the corresponding breakthrough-eﬀort distributions see Section 3.3.
I ﬁnd that in the equilibrium there are three diﬀerent eﬀects at work: free-riding,
which reduces the overall eﬀort the more players are working on the project. The
second eﬀect is encouragement, which depends on the threshold distribution: Given
a decreasing hazard rate my own eﬀort encourages the other players to work less, while
given an increasing hazard rate, my work encourages my coworkers to work more in
the future. The last eﬀect is delay of eﬀort, which causes players to work later rather
than earlier, even with the presence of a discount rate which lets players want to have
a breakthrough as soon as possible.3
Free-riding is a common eﬀect in moral hazard problems and already well understood.
Encouragement also occurs frequently in the literature, however usually either only as a
positive encouragement eﬀect (for example in Georgiadis (2014)) or only as a negative
2Which we will call breakthrough-eﬀort distribution.
3This eﬀect is more than just a consequence of discounting, as the discount rate does not only
eﬀect the costs but also the beneﬁts. As the beneﬁts are, by design, later than the costs and higher
than the expected costs a discount rate lets players work earlier.
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encouragement eﬀect (as in many bandit models).4 The positive encouragement eﬀect
is very similar to strategic complementarity and the negative encouragement eﬀect to
strategic substitutability. My model, however, can incorporate both eﬀects and the
occurrence of positive or negative encouragement depends on the type of the project
(i.e. the breakthrough-eﬀort distribution).
Delay of eﬀort as a result of rational players, has, to the best of my knowledge, not
been analyzed before in this context. In this model it is caused by convex costs, which
make it optimal for the players to spread their eﬀort as evenly as possible, a deadline
and uncertainty about the eﬀort required for a breakthrough. When they start working
on a project, the players have a belief about the threshold that includes very low eﬀort
levels and they are trying to ﬁnd an optimal eﬀort level given this belief. If they do
not succeed at ﬁrst, they realize that the threshold eﬀort level is not that low and that
they have to update their beliefs about the threshold. Therefore, they also have to
increase their eﬀort level to reﬂect the updated beliefs. Hence, we can expect some
delay even with a rational social planner trying to maximize social welfare. Close to
the deadline, the eﬀect even outweighs any other eﬀect, including encouragement and
even strong discounting. Therefore, we can observe a last-minute rush.
These results have implications on the evaluation of projects: Not only should man-
agers avoid the negative encouragement eﬀect but, using a positive encouragement
eﬀect, they might be able to counteract the ever-present incentives to free-ride. As
this encouragement eﬀect depends on the type of requirements uncertainty it might be
possible to switch from a negative eﬀect to a positive eﬀect by resolving some of these
uncertainties or sometimes even by introducing new uncertainty into the project's ob-
jectives.
Another point to take away from the results of this chapter is the occurrence of a
last-minute rush in the welfare-maximizing solution. This might have further impli-
cations on the evaluation of the often observed increased workload around deadlines.
This eﬀect is usually dismissed as a result of (irrational) procrastination. This chapter,
however, shows that it might not only be a rational consequence of unclear objectives
but possibly even welfare maximizing.
This chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, I will give an overview of the
relevant literature and how this work ﬁts into it. Then, I will explain the model in Sec-
tion 3.2, followed by an explanation of the breakthrough-eﬀort distribution and how it
translates to diﬀerent projects in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, I derive the optimal eﬀort
for the non-cooperative and the welfare maximizing case. Additionally, I show that
there is a last-minute rush, i.e., delay of eﬀort which leads to a peak of eﬀort towards
4One example is Bonatti and Hörner (2011) in which the negative encouragement eﬀect is the
unnamed eﬀect leading to procrastination in their model.
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the end in both cases. Then I will brieﬂy discuss the eﬀect of deadlines (Section 3.5.1),
the model without discounting (Section 3.5.3) and how diﬀerent types of projects react
to changes in costs and changes in the quality of the project (Section 3.5.5). I will give
some concluding remarks in Section 3.5.6.
3.1.1 Literature
This chapter is related to diﬀerent ﬁelds of the literature: Holmstrom (1982) started
the game theoretic literature on moral hazard in teams, which was then expanded by
Ma, Moore, and Turnbull (1988), Legros and Matthews (1993) and Winter (2004), to
mention only a few important contributions. A common theme is the focus on free-
rider problems due to shared rewards but costly private eﬀort. My work adds to this
literature as it analyzes a dynamic moral hazard problem, in which players have very
restricted information about the actions of others, which leads to free-riding and a
delay of eﬀort.
In parts, this model is related to the literature on strategic experimentation as it models
the behavior of players who optimize their decisions while gathering information at the
same time. In these games every player has to divide her time between a safe and a
risky action (as in the arms of a two-armed bandit) with unknown but common pay-
oﬀs. Bolton and Harris (1999) analyze a two-armed bandit problem with many players
in which the arms yield payoﬀs which behave like a Brownian Motion, with diﬀerent
drifts for the safe and the risky arm. They characterize the unique symmetric Markov
Perfect equilibrium and are able to identify free-rider and encouragement eﬀects. In
Keller, Rady, and Cripps's (2005) model of strategic experimentation, in which the
risky arm yields a lump-sum with a certain intensity if the the risky arm is good and
nothing if the risky arm is bad, new information arrive as a Poisson process, as in most
of the recent literature on bandit problems. Two examples for this literature are Klein
and Rady (2011), where the risky arms are negatively correlated, and Klein (2013) who
extended the model to three armed bandits.
My work is very closely related (and was inspired by) Bonatti and Hörner (2011).5
They analyze a bandit model, similar to Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005), in which
eﬀorts are private information and only outcomes are observable. After a success the
game ends and payoﬀs are realized.
The model presented in this chapter is a very particular model of strategic exper-
imentation: Not only is the information a player gathers about the actions of the
other players very restricted, but furthermore, players' payoﬀs are perfectly correlated.
However, models of strategic experimentation usually assume the news arrival to be
5In fact, their benchmark model is a special case of my model with an incomplete exponential
distribution and linear instead of quadratic costs. See Example 2 for more information.
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a Poisson process, whereas my model has hardly any restriction on this news arrival
process.
Bonatti and Hörner (2011) also exempliﬁes another strand of literature which this chap-
ter is related to: dynamic contribution games. Already suggested by Schelling (1960),
these models analyze the dynamic contributions to public goods. Admati and Perry
(1991) and Lockwood and Thomas (2002) are examples for games in which contribu-
tions are observable. In Georgiadis (2014), there is no uncertainty about the valuation
of the public good but about how eﬀort aﬀects the provision of the public good. He
assumes that eﬀort aﬀects the drift of a standard Brownian motion towards a (com-
monly known) threshold and is able to not only identify free-riding and encouragement
eﬀects, but also to show that the optimal contract only compensates on success. Al-
though in this chapter the uncertainty is about the threshold and not about the eﬀect
of eﬀort, these two models are closely related when hazard rates are increasing as shown
in Example 3. My work introduces uncertainty about the eﬀort needed to provide the
public good. Therefore, players also have to incorporate information gathering into
their decision process. Furthermore, I show that, due to the presence of a deadline,
delaying eﬀort is optimal.
There is a huge literature on procrastination in economics and psychology. However,
these usually attribute procrastination to self-control problems (O'Donoghue and Rabin
(2001)) or time-inconsistencies like hyperbolic discounting (Laibson (1997)). Another
explanation for procrastination is given by Akerlof (1991): According to him, procras-
tination is a consequence of repeated errors of judgment due to unwarranted salience
of some costs and beneﬁts relative to others (Akerlof, 1991, p. 3).
The literature on procrastination in psychology is much more prominent than in eco-
nomics but, like the economic literature, it almost exclusively focuses on some form of
cognitive biased decisions (e.g., Wolters (2003) or Klingsieck (2015)).
This chapter adds to this literature, as it models not only decision processes of a single
person but also delayed eﬀort in teams, i.e. in a game-theoretic model. Furthermore,
it provides an explanation for observed procrastination as rational and even welfare-
maximizing behavior and therefore gives rise to completely diﬀerent measures that
should (or should not) be taken.
Bergemann and Hege (2005) use a very similar information structure to the one pre-
sented in this chapter, but analyze a problem in discrete time with linear costs and a
memoryless investment. Second, Khan and Stinchcombe (2015) analyze decision prob-
lems in which changes can occur at random times and require a costly reaction. They
have identiﬁed situations in which delayed reaction is optimal, depending on the form
of the hazard rate of the underlying changing probability distributions. The relation-
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ship of this model to the latter paper is mostly in the use of the hazard rate as a
description of the projects players are working on.
To summarize, this chapter contributes to the literature in two diﬀerent ways: On the
one hand, it provides a tractable model to analyze a very general class of dynamic
contribution games in continuous time with many players and incomplete informa-
tion about eﬀort contribution. The model deals with very diﬀerent types of projects:
Projects in which the success probability decreases in eﬀort already spent,6 e.g. through
learning about the quality of the project (which is very common in bandit models),
investment projects similar to Georgiadis (2014) where the past eﬀort increases the
chance of success now and even projects in which past eﬀort increases chance of suc-
cess on some intervals and decreases on others.
Furthermore, this model can explain situations in which delaying eﬀort is not only
rational (which was also observed in Bonatti and Hörner (2011))7 but even welfare
maximizing and arises without the assumption of time-inconsistencies or cognitive bi-
ased players. In addition to this, I was able to identify a strategic encouragement eﬀect
which can be beneﬁcial or harmful to the projects success, depending on the type of
uncertainties the players are facing.
3.2 The model
Consider n risk neutral players working together on a project in continuous time t ∈
[0, T ]. Players can only observe their own past eﬀort and whether the project was
successful. After a success the players get a lump sum payment, normalized to 1, and
the game ends. Every player i chooses at every point in time t whether to exert a
costly eﬀort ui : [0, T ] → R+ with quadratic instantaneous costs at t: cui(t)2. If the
project was not successful at time T , the deadline of this project, the game ends and
the project can therefore never be completed.
The utility function of player i is, given a breakthrough at time t¯, therefore given by
V˜i(ui, t¯) = re
−rt¯ − r
t¯∫
0
e−rtcui(t)2 dt
with r being the common discount rate. We can see the two parts of the utility function
here: the ﬁrst part is the lump sum payment, which occurs only once at time t¯ and
is therefore discounted by re−rt. The second part is the cost cui(t)2 which occurs at
6Covered by decreasing hazard rates of the breakthrough eﬀort distribution.
7However, what they call procrastination, is, in the terms of my model, a result of the (negative)
encouragement eﬀect.
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every point in time (and depends on the eﬀort ui(t)) up until t¯.
Therefore, we have to ﬁgure out the point in time t¯ at which the project is successful.
Deﬁnition 4 speciﬁes this time t¯ as the time at which the players have accumulated
enough eﬀort:
Deﬁnition 4 (Eﬀort Threshold). The project is successful in t¯ if the players have
exerted enough eﬀort, i.e. if
x ≤
t¯∫
0
∑
∀i
ui(t) dt
Remark. This deﬁnition implies the assumptions of symmetric, additively separable
and linear eﬀects of eﬀorts and non-depreciation of eﬀort.
This threshold x is drawn before the game and is unknown to all players. They have a
common prior about its probability density function f and hence, about its cumulative
distribution function F . This breakthrough eﬀort distribution can be interpreted as
the type of task or project (see Section 3.3).
Due to Deﬁnition 4 we can deﬁne x(t) as the overall eﬀort already spent up until t:
x(t) :=
t∫
0
∑
∀i
ui(s) ds and u−i(t) =
∑
∀j 6=i
uj(t) as the eﬀort of all players except i at a
certain time t without loss of information.
From the deﬁnition of the game above, we can derive the expected utility for player i,
given eﬀort proﬁle {ui, u−i}:
Vi (ui(t), u−i(t), x(t)) = r
T∫
0
e−rt(1−F (x(t)))

f(x(t))
(∑
∀j
uj(t)
)
1− F (x(t)) − cui(t)
2
 dt (3.1)
To ﬁnd the expected utility, as stated in Equation (3.1), one has to take the expec-
tations with respect to t¯, using Deﬁnition 4. For a detailed derivation please refer to
Section 3.6.1.
The expected utility has an intuitive interpretation: The factor in front of the squared
brackets 1 − F (x(t)) gives the probability that we had no success before time t or,
in other words, that we reach time t. The two terms in squared brackets give us the
updated belief of the player about having success at time t minus the costs they have
to bear.
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3.3 The breakthrough eﬀort distribution
The most important characteristic of a project in this model is the breakthrough-eﬀort
distribution or, in other words, how much eﬀort one has to spend for a certain chance
of success, given the eﬀort that has been spent by the team in the past. Therefore,
this distribution describes how likely every possible eﬀort threshold is at the present
stage of the project. If the player thinks ﬁnding a cure for a disease costs around 100
billion man hours of research, she could assume for example some normal distribution
around 100 billion. If I am certain I lost my keys in my apartment (again), but have
no idea where they could be, assuming a uniform distribution over every place in my
apartment seems reasonable.
In this section I am going to give examples of three basic classes of distributions and
how they can be interpreted in the context of the model. The distributions will be
denoted by their hazard rates h(x(t)) := f(x(t))
1−F (x(t)) , which basically describes the eﬀect
of past eﬀort on the eﬀectiveness of current eﬀort.
Example 1 (Constant hazard rate). The ﬁrst type of distribution has a constant hazard
rate, i.e., the exponential distribution (F (x) = 1− e−λx with a rate parameter λ > 0).
This distribution conveys the idea that the chance of success only depends on the current
eﬀort and past eﬀort does not matter at all, for example if you are trying to push a
boulder out of your way or trying to force a door open.
Example 2 (Decreasing hazard rate). A variation of the exponential distribution is an
incomplete exponential distribution8 (i.e., an exponential distribution with a probability
mass at inﬁnity). Although technically a distribution with a decreasing hazard rate,
the intuition is similar to the example of the memoryless distribution: The probability
distribution itself is memoryless, however there is a chance of failure. As time proceeds,
the expected probability of failure is updated and therefore increases in the eﬀort already
spent. A popular example for a decreasing hazard rate is a search model, similar to
Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005), where you search at the most likely places ﬁrst or
investments into R&D: the more you invest without success, the higher is your belief
that there is no solution to the problem.
Example 3 (Increasing hazard rate). The last example is the class of increasing hazard
rates (e.g., when the breakthrough eﬀort is distributed uniformly on some interval).
Possible applications are projects with a strong learning-by-doing eﬀect and projects
where the success in a certain period depends on the cumulative eﬀort, not on current
eﬀort.9 A simple example for this class is moving something heavy from A to B.
8Using this distribution in my model yields us a model very similar to the so-called good news
bandit models. One example is Bonatti and Hörner's (2011) benchmark model, the only diﬀerence
being that I use quadratic instead of linear costs.
9One example is Georgiadis (2014). In his model the uncertainty is about the eﬀect of eﬀort and
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For more examples I would like to refer to Section 2 in Khan and Stinchcombe (2015),
who provide an overview about the meaning of success probability distributions, their
hazard rates and their relations to diﬀerent projects.
Although all examples in this chapter will be from one of the three classes, the results
also hold for general distributions.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Non-cooperative solution
The best response of player i to the strategies of the other players u−i(t) can be stated
as the following optimal control problem (omitting the time index t from x(t) and
ui(t)):
max
ui,x
Vi = r
T∫
0
e−rt(1− F (x))
(
f(x)(ui + u−i)
1− F (x) − cu
2
i
)
dt (3.2)
with boundary conditions x(0) = 0 for the cumulative eﬀort at time 0.
The following technical assumption restricts our attention to distributions for which
there is neither a certain success nor a certain failure.
Assumption 1. The hazard rate h(x) := f(x)
1−F (x) > 0 is continuous in x and bounded
above for every ﬁnite x.
Note that this assumption allows for a probability mass point at ∞. Given Assump-
tion 1 on the hazard rate of the breakthrough-eﬀort distribution we can ﬁnd the sym-
metric equilibrium path.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium Eﬀort). There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
in which, on the equilibrium path, u (i.e., the individual eﬀort of a player) evolves
according to
u˙ =
2n− 1
2
h(x)u2 + ru− r
2c
h(x)
and reaches uT =
1
2c
h(xT ) at the deadline T .
To ﬁnd this equilibrium eﬀort path, I use the Pontryagin maximum principle to solve
the optimal control problem given by Equation (3.2) and then use symmetry to ﬁnd
not the threshold, but this is just a diﬀerent way to model uncertainty about the relationship between
eﬀort spent and success. One can therefore generate a very similar model in the framework presented
by choosing the appropriate breakthrough eﬀort distribution, which would have an increasing hazard
rate.
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a candidate for the equilibrium eﬀort. I then verify existence and uniqueness of this
symmetric equilibrium and show suﬃciency via a convexity argument. For the complete
proof see Section 3.6.2.
Remark (Nash equilibria). All equilibria in this chapter are symmetric Nash equilibria
in pure strategies. To see that these are Nash equilibria, it helps to check the possible
histories of the players: At every point in time they only know the time t, their past
eﬀort and that they where not successful so far. Therefore, every information set is
just a point in time t. It follows from Assumption 1 that each information set (i.e.,
each time t) is reached with a positive probability. Hence, every information set is part
of the Nash equilibrium. From this reasoning we also know that the symmetric Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies is also a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, given correct
beliefs: uˆj = uj, ∀j 6= i for every player i. However, the oﬀ-equilibrium behavior is still
discussed later in this section.
Remark (Asymmetric equilibria). In this chapter I am not analyzing asymmetric equi-
libria, as, given the symmetric setting, restricting our attention to symmetric equilibria
seems natural. In addition, it is clear that every asymmetric equilibrium is, in terms
of welfare and as a consequence of the convex cost structure, inferior to the symmetric
equilibrium, as can be seen in Lemma 1 in the following section.
Example 1 (continuing from p. 45). For the exponential distribution with rate param-
eter λ, the solution from Theorem 1 reduces to:
u˙ =
2n− 1
2
λu2 + ru− r
2c
λ
uT =
1
2c
λ
(3.3)
which has an explicit solution given in Section 3.6.6. Given this solution, some ob-
servations about this class of distributions can already be made: Independent of the
number of players (and the discount rate), the individual eﬀort right before the dead-
line is always the same. Furthermore, we can see that the individual eﬀort decreases in
the number of players, despite the fact that the reward for completion for each player is
independent of the number of players. Figure 3.1 shows an example of the equilibrium
eﬀort path for one and three players.
Remark (Oﬀ-equilibrium behavior). In the following, I am going to focus my attention
on the equilibrium behavior. However, let me brieﬂy discuss the oﬀ-equilibrium behavior
that arises if one player deviates from the equilibrium path. If she exerts less eﬀort at
time t, her continuation strategy after t depends on the hazard rate of the underlying
breakthrough eﬀort distribution:
 Given a constant hazard rate, nothing changes for her. In this special case,
behavior is independent of the past, hence she will immediately revert to the equi-
librium eﬀort.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium eﬀort (con-
stant hazard rate)
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium eﬀort (decreasing haz-
ard rate)
 Given an increasing hazard rate, her belief about the probability of success
is now lower than that of her collaborators. Therefore, she will also exert less
eﬀort in the future. Given a high enough slope of the hazard rate, this leads to
divergence of her belief (and therefore eﬀort) and the beliefs of the other players.
 Given a decreasing hazard rate, her belief about the probability of success is
now higher than that of her collaborators. This leads to a higher eﬀort until her
belief coincides again with the belief of the other players, as soon as she has made
up the eﬀort she previously failed to exert exerted. So, given enough time, in this
case the player will revert to the symmetric equilibrium.
3.4.2 Welfare maximizing solution
To solve the problem of the social planner, we have to solve a problem similar to
Equation (3.2). However, now we maximize the combined utility and therefore:
max
ui
Vi = r
T∫
0
e−rt(1− F (x))
nf(x)(
∑
∀i
ui)
1− F (x) −
∑
∀i
cu2i
 dt (3.4)
We can focus on the symmetric problem in which every player exerts u¯(t) without loss
of generality, as the following Lemma shows us:
Lemma 1. Every welfare-maximizing eﬀort path has to be symmetric.
The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows: Due to the assumptions of symmetric and
additive-separable eﬀects of eﬀorts (Deﬁnition 4) and convex costs an equal distribution
of the eﬀorts exerted at every point in time results in the same probability of success
but a lower sum of costs. For a short proof see Section 3.6.4.
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Figure 3.3: Nash equilibrium eﬀort
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
t0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
u
T= 7 , c= 1 , Α= 1.9 , Β= 0.99 , r= 0.1
n= 1
n= 2
n= 3
Figure 3.4: Welfare maximizing eﬀort
Therefore we get the social planners optimization problem
max
u¯
Vi = r
T∫
0
e−rt(1− F (x))
(
f(x)(n2u¯)
1− F (x) − ncu¯
)
dt (3.5)
And its solution which is derived in a similar fashion to Theorem 1 in Section 3.6.5.
Theorem 2 (Welfare Maximizing Eﬀort). The unique eﬀort u that every player has to
exert that maximizes the social planners problem (Equation (3.4)) evolves according
to
u˙ =
1
2
h(x)u2 + ru− nr
2c
h(x)
and reaches uT =
n
2c
h(xT ) at time T .
Now let us compare the welfare maximizing solution to the (non-cooperative) equilib-
rium eﬀort for the case of the constant hazard rate:
Example 1 (continuing from p. 45). If we have constant hazard rates, we can directly
compare the non-cooperative equilibrium and the socially optimal eﬀort. It turns out
that in this case the socially optimal eﬀort is always larger than the equilibrium eﬀort.
This can be checked by simply calculating the diﬀerence between the welfare-maximizing
eﬀort and the equilibrium eﬀort, as stated in Section 3.6.6.
Given this example, one might suspect that the welfare maximizing solution is to
always exert more eﬀort than in the equilibrium. While this can be observed with an
increasing or a constant hazard rate, it is not true for decreasing hazard rates, as can be
seen in the following example in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 (which uses the incomplete
exponential distribution with rate α and failure rate 1− β). Here we can see that the
welfare-maximizing eﬀort starts oﬀ being higher but, due to the decreasing belief in
the success of the project, decreases much faster than in the equilibrium.
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3.4.3 Free-riding, encouragement eﬀect and delay of eﬀort
In this section I analyzing free-riding, the encouragement eﬀect and delay of eﬀort.
Free-riding
Free-riding is usually deﬁned as players exerting less eﬀort because there are others
who also exert eﬀort, i.e., a players lets the others do the work. As can be expected
there will always be free-riding in this model. One can verify this by looking at the
best response function in Section 3.6.2. The instantaneous eﬀort of a player is strictly
decreasing in the instantaneous eﬀort of the other players. This is due to the fact that
the eﬀort of every player in one period are perfect substitutes. An illustration of this
behavior can be found in Figures 3.1 and 3.2
Encouragement eﬀect
This eﬀect is deﬁned as: My actions aﬀect the eﬃciency of eﬀort for every player in
the future and therefore their choice of eﬀort. The direction in which my eﬀort aﬀects
the eﬀort of others depends on the hazard rate. For an increasing hazard rate, the
eﬀect is called encouragement eﬀect for a good reason:10 Every eﬀort I spend now
increases the eﬃciency and therefore the eﬀort of everyone in the future. Clearly, this
also leads to higher eﬀorts now. However, with a decreasing hazard rate, this eﬀect is
a negative encouragement or discouragement eﬀect: If I spend much eﬀort now and we
do not succeed, we have a lower belief about the chance of succeeding in the future and
therefore we will work less. This leads to less eﬀort, especially in the earlier periods.
Remark (Strategic complements/substitutes and the encouragement eﬀect). As al-
ready mentioned in the introduction, the positive encouragement eﬀect (due to an in-
creasing hazard rate of the breakthrough-eﬀort distribution) is very similar to strategic
complementarity: My eﬀort now is a strategic complement to all players' future eﬀorts.
In the same sense, the negative encouragement eﬀect is similar to a strategic substitute
for future eﬀorts.
If that is the case, why can't one just say that with increasing hazard rates, current
eﬀorts and future eﬀorts are strategic complements, and with decreasing hazard rates
they are strategic substitutes? The problem is that current eﬀorts of diﬀerent players
are substitutes (and therefore strategic substitutes), which is the source for free-riding.
Hence, we cannot clearly say if, given an increasing hazard rate, eﬀorts are strategic
substitutes or complements. However, for decreasing (and constant) hazard rates, we
know that the eﬀorts of all players at all times are strategic substitutes.
10For example by Georgiadis (2014), where past eﬀorts always have a positive eﬀect on the
eﬀectiveness of eﬀort, or in terms of this chapter: projects always have a breakthrough eﬀort dis-
tribution with an increasing hazard rate.
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Delay of eﬀort
It is not surprising that the eﬀort of players increases if they assume an increasing
hazard rate. But what does the optimal eﬀort for a decreasing hazard rate look like?
From the example depicted in Figure 3.2 we already get a good idea of what the typical
optimal eﬀort path might look like:11 At ﬁrst, we have a decrease in eﬀort. This is
due to the encouragement eﬀect: At ﬁrst the (perceived) probability of success is high,
but due to the decreasing hazard rate as more eﬀort is invested, the success rate and
therefore the eﬀort level decreases. However, we can see that, after some time, the
eﬀort increases again. What might be the reason for this behavior? By investing
early we discourage players to invest at every following point in time, so they postpone
investment to a later point in time. However, looking at the case of only one player
in Figure 3.2 we see the same eﬀect, albeit less pronounced. Therefore, as a single
player is neither aﬀected by the encouragement eﬀect nor by free-riding we can clearly
identify another eﬀect: delay of eﬀort.
To investigate if this is a general eﬀect let us ﬁrst deﬁne "last-minute rush".
Deﬁnition 5 (Last-minute rush). Player i exhibits a last-minute rush if and only if
∃δ > 0 s.t. ui is increasing on [T − δ, T ].
If we observe a last-minute rush, we know that the delay of eﬀort outweighs every
opposing eﬀect (e.g. the eﬀect of strong discounting) near the deadline.
Given Theorem 1, we can show that a last-minute rush can be observed for every
variation of the model:
Theorem 3 (Last-minute rush). For every possible breakthrough-eﬀort distribution
that fulﬁlls Assumption 1, players delay there eﬀort, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5, on the
symmetric equilibrium path.
For the complete proof I would like to refer to Section 3.6.3. The interpretation,
however, is clear: Whatever eﬀects are at work during the ﬁrst parts of the project,
towards the end delay always dominates the other eﬀects.
As this eﬀect is independent of the number of players it can not be explained by free-
riding and it can not be a result of discounting, as it does not depend on the discount
factor. Furthermore, it is diﬀerent and independent from the encouragement eﬀect,
which can be shown by the following example (and Figure 3.1). Therefore, we know
that there is another eﬀect, which shifts eﬀort towards the end.
Example 1 (continuing from p. 45). Let us now have another look at the case of
constant hazard rates. This case is special, as current eﬀort is not inﬂuenced by past
eﬀort at all. Therefore, we have no encouragement eﬀect (only pure free-riding) and
11In this example the required eﬀort for a breakthrough is distributed according to the incomplete
exponential distribution with rate α and a mass point 1− β at ∞.
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it is easy to see that, without a deadline (i.e., T =∞), the eﬀort would be constant12.
However, if we introduce a deadline, this changes and we see an increasing eﬀort as
depicted in Figure 3.1 and Equation (3.3).
Now we know that we have a last-minute rush in the competitive case, but what about
the social optimum? The following proposition shows that we can expect a rational
social planner to delay eﬀort.
Theorem 4 (Last-minute rush of the social planner). The welfare-maximizing behav-
ior always leads to a last-minute rush as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5, independent of the
breakthrough-eﬀort distribution.
The proof of Theorem 4 is analogous to the proof of Theorem 3 and can be found in
Section 3.6.5.
We have seen that even in the welfare maximizing case without memory (i.e. the
exponential distribution), more eﬀort is invested close to the deadline. However, it
is not present in Bonatti and Hörner (2011), a very similar model with linear instead
of quadratic costs.13 Therefore, we can safely assume that this eﬀect is only present
when we have convex costs, a deadline and when there is uncertainty about the amount
of work we have to put into a project to succeed. Section 3.5.3 shows us that a higher
discount rate can dampen this eﬀect, but we know from Theorem 3 that it can never
eliminated completely. As this eﬀect is also present in the welfare maximizing case we
can conclude: Delaying eﬀort is not only commonly observed in reality, but might also
be rational and even part of the welfare-maximizing solution.
3.5 Discussion
In this section, we are going to have a look at a few results and implications of this
model. in Section 3.5.1, we discuss the implications of variable deadlines. In Sec-
tion 3.5.2, we show that delay of eﬀort can not exist without uncertain objectives.
Furthermore, we discuss the special case of patient players in Section 3.5.3, the eﬀect
12To do so, we can compare the problem at t0 = 0 and any other time t: The only diﬀerences
between these two problems are the past time t and the eﬀort already exerted x(t). As t in the past
has no inﬂuence on the best response now, time left is the same and, due to the special properties of the
exponential distribution, x(t) has no eﬀect on the beliefs about the success, the problems we are facing
at t0 and t are the same. Therefore, assuming we also have a unique best response, the continuation
strategies at t0 and t are the same for every t, i.e. players exert a constant eﬀort, independently of t.
13In their model, the welfare-maximizing eﬀort is as follows: As the chance of success decreases in
the invested eﬀort, players invest the maximal amount of eﬀort until the marginal beneﬁts of eﬀort
are lower than the marginal costs. After that point is reached, no eﬀort is invested anymore.
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of diﬀerent costs and diﬀerent qualities of projects (Section 3.5.5) and the eﬀect of
changing the number of players (Section 3.5.4).
3.5.1 Deadlines
We have already seen that deadlines induce delay of eﬀort, i.e. an accumulation of
eﬀort shortly before the deadline. But is it possible to improve welfare by a deadline?
Given that we only consider rational individuals, one would not expect a deadline to be
beneﬁcial if the hazard rate of the breakthrough-eﬀort distribution is constant or even
increasing. Now, Bonatti and Hörner (2011) have shown that, in their setup (i.e., with
certain type of decreasing hazard rates and linear costs), there is always a deadline
that improves welfare.
However, with quadratic costs, I was not able to identify any situation in which dead-
lines improve welfare. Simulations suggest that the welfare maximizing deadline is
always the least restrictive (i.e. the deadline which allows the most time to complete
the task) one. This is probably due to the smoothing eﬀect of convex costs, which
makes it optimal to spread costs over time as evenly as possible. In Figure 3.5 you can
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Figure 3.5: Eﬀect of deadlines on eﬀorts
see that the eﬀorts behave as expected: Shorter deadlines lead to overall higher eﬀorts
and, given a short enough deadline, we can even prevent the decrease of eﬀort early on.
However the eﬀect of a (shorter) deadline on the utility (and therefore the welfare) is,
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at least in my simulations, always negative, as shown in the example in Figure 3.6.14
The question whether deadlines can improve welfare is therefore still open. However,
simulations suggest that, (shorter) deadlines are never beneﬁcial.
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Figure 3.6: Eﬀect of deadlines on welfare
3.5.2 Full information
One might expect that delaying eﬀort is also optimal in the full information case, i.e.
when the players (or the social planner) already know the eﬀort threshold x¯. The
following simple example shows that this is not true, if the costs or the threshold are
suﬃciently low or if the discount rate is suﬃciently high:
Example 4. Assume that the the costs are low enough, s.t. (abusing the notation of
c(·)): c ( x¯
n
) ≤ 1 − e−rT . Then the losses due to delay until the end T are higher then
the highest possible costs that can occur in the symmetric equilibrium.
Let us compare the utility from getting the work done at t = 0: V0 = 1 − c
(
x¯
n
)
and
from getting the work done at t = T : VT = e
−rT − cT where cT are some non-negative
costs. Then we know that:
V0 = 1− c
( x¯
n
)
> e−rT − cT = VT
14The last example uses again a incomplete exponential distribution as in Bonatti and Hörner
(2011).
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Completing the project at t = 0 is strictly better (but not necessarily optimal). There-
fore, working until the end can never be optimal.
Solving the problem with full information15 shows that the optimal solution is to dis-
tribute the required eﬀort between 0 and some time t∗ ≤ T , such that the discounted
marginal costs are the same at every point in time. This means that, due to discounting,
the eﬀort is increasing until t∗ and zero afterwards.
3.5.3 Patient players
So far, we have only considered the problem in which players are impatient. For patient
players (r = 0), the solution from Theorem 1 simpliﬁes to
u˙ =
2n− 1
2
h(x)u2
uT =
1
2c
h(xT )
As we know that h(x) and u are always positive, the following Proposition 1 is an
obvious result:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium eﬀort of patient players (i.e. r = 0) is increasing
everywhere, concave for decreasing hazard rates and convex for increasing hazard rates.
It is not surprising that, without an incentive to work early, we observe even more delay
of eﬀort, i.e. eﬀort is shifted to the end. A very nice example for this phenomenon can
be seen in Figure 3.7, where equilibrium eﬀorts paths of diﬀerent discount rates r are
shown. Furthermore, we can see that in our model decreasing eﬀorts, which are for
example observed in Figure 3.2 and in Bonatti and Hörner (2011) are, only possible if
impatience is strong enough to counteract the delay of eﬀort.
Example 1 (continuing from p. 45). For the exponential distribution with rate param-
eter λ and r = 0, the solution from Theorem 1 reduces to:
x(t) =
2λ(log(2c+ (2n− 1)T )− log(2c+ (2n− 1)(T − t)))
2n− 1
which is clearly increasing in t.
3.5.4 The eﬀect of the number of players
We have assumed a ﬁxed number of players. What happens if the number of players
changes? Assuming increasing hazard rates, the eﬀect is pretty clear: we have stronger
15For example by ﬁnding the best path u∗(t) for the problem max
u∗
e−rt
∗ −
t∗∫
0
e−rtc (u∗(t)) dt
s.t.
t∗∫
0
c (u∗(t)) dt = x¯, for every t∗, and then ﬁnding the best t∗.
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Figure 3.7: Equilibrium eﬀort for diﬀerent discount rates
free-riding but in turn have more overall eﬀort which, due to the encouragement eﬀect,
leads to higher eﬀorts by the players. With a constant hazard rate, we only have have
free-riding, so every individual will work less but thanks to quadratic costs and the
fact that the payout does not depend on the number of players, we can expect higher
overall eﬀorts. As the encouragement eﬀect only depends on the cumulative eﬀort, we
can also expect the same eﬀect with a decreasing hazard rate, which can be observed
in the example of an incomplete exponential distribution in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9.
Here we can see the lower individual eﬀorts and higher cumulative eﬀorts for higher
number of players.
3.5.5 Eﬀect of costs and project quality on diﬀerent projects
One might expect that costs and the general quality of a project (i.e., the chance of
success), might have very simple eﬀects on the eﬀorts of the players: Higher costs
should lead to lower eﬀorts, while higher probabilities of success should lead to to
higher eﬀorts. While this intuition is true for the constant and increasing hazard rates,
this eﬀect is not that simple if we have a project that is described by a decreasing
hazard rate, for example if there is a chance of failure. In this case, we might observe
that due to the negative encouragement eﬀect, the instantaneous eﬀort starts out being
higher but declines faster and ﬁnally is even lower than in the case with higher costs
(Figure 3.10) or a better quality project (Figure 3.11). In the latter case we can even
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Figure 3.8: Eﬀort for diﬀerent num-
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Figure 3.9: Cumulative eﬀort for diﬀerent num-
bers of players
observe that it is possible that the cumulative eﬀort is lower, due to faster updating of
the failure probability.
3.5.6 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed a problem of a team working together on a project where the indi-
vidual team members are unable to observe each others' eﬀorts and have only a rough
idea about the amount of eﬀort that will be needed to complete the project. This
leads to free-riding and encouragement, as well as to delay eﬀort. The delay analyzed
here is not a result of ineﬃcient behavior but a necessary consequence of the deadline
and convex costs, given the information structure. Although diﬀerent types of projects
lead to very diﬀerent behavior, a last-minute rush always occurs as long as a deadline
is present. The encouragement eﬀect on the other hand has very diﬀerent eﬀects, de-
pending on the type of project. In this model, delay of eﬀort is so prominent that close
to the deadline, it is stronger than every other eﬀect.
This chapter opens up a lot of questions for further research, examples being an anal-
ysis of the optimal compensation scheme for diﬀerent projects, or whether choosing
deadlines is an eﬃcient tool for a social planner or a principal who is only interested in
a breakthrough. Another interesting question is the eﬀect of team size, which is brieﬂy
touched upon in Section 3.5.4.
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Figure 3.10: Equilibrium eﬀort paths for diﬀerent costs
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Figure 3.11: Equilibrium eﬀort paths for diﬀerent project qualities
58
CHAPTER 3. PROJECTS WITH UNCERTAIN REQUIREMENTS
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Derivation of the expected utility
We know that the breakthrough eﬀort is drawn from a distribution with the probability
distribution function f and the cumulative distribution function F and that x(t) is by
Deﬁnition 4
x(t) =
t∫
0
ui(s) + u−i(s) ds
with u−i(s) =
∑
∀j 6=i
uj(s). The breakthrough time t¯ is the ﬁrst time enough eﬀort (i.e.,
the breakthrough eﬀort) is accumulated:
t¯ = inf{t ≥ 0|x(t) ≥ x¯}.
The expected utility is then, given breakthrough time t¯
V˜i(ui, t¯) = re
−rt¯ − r
t¯∫
0
ertc(ui(t)) dt.
Therefore we know that the payoﬀ part of the expected utility is equal to the distribu-
tion of t¯: f(t¯). As we know that the CDF F (t¯) of t¯ is
Ft¯(t) = P [t ≥ t¯] = P [x(t) ≥ x¯] = F (x(t))⇒ ft¯(t) = f (x(t)) (ui(t) + u−i(t)) ,
so the expected payoﬀ is
Et¯
[
re−rt¯
]
= r
T∫
0
e−rtf (x(t)) (ui(t) + u−i(t)) dt. (3.6)
For the expected costs r
t¯∫
0
ertc(ui(t)) dt, we have to distinguish between two cases: One
in which the project is successful (i.e., t¯ < T ) and we pay until t¯ and one in which it
is unsuccessful (t¯ ≥ T ) and we only pay until T . As we know that 1− Ft¯(∞) = P [t¯ =
∞] = P [x¯ > x(∞)] = 1− F (x(∞)) we get:
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∫ ∞
0
∫ min{t,T}
0
e−rscu(s) ds dF (x(t)) + (1− F (x(∞))
∫ T
0
e−rsc(u(s)) ds
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1s<t1s<T e
−rsc(u(s)) ds dF (x(t)) + (1− F (x(∞))
∫ T
0
e−rsc(u(s)) ds
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1s<t1s<T e
−rsc(u(s)) dF (x(t)) ds+ (1− F (x(∞))
∫ T
0
e−rsc(u(s)) ds
=
∫ ∞
0
1s<T e
−rsc(u(s))
∫ ∞
0
1s<t dF (x(t)) ds+ (1− F (x(∞))
∫ T
0
e−rsc(u(s)) ds
=
∫ ∞
0
1s<T e
−rsc(u(s))(1− F (x(s)) ds
=
∫ T
0
e−rsc(u(s))(1− F (x(s)) ds. (3.7)
If we add the expected payoﬀ (Equation (3.6)) and the expected costs (Equation (3.7)),
we get the expected utility, as stated in Equation (3.1):
Vi = r
T∫
0
e−rt(1− F (x(t)))
f(x(t))(
∑
∀j
uj(t))
1− F (x(t)) − c(ui(t))
 dt.
3.6.2 Theorem 1 (Optimal Eﬀort)
Candidate solution
Finding the best response ui of some player i to the strategies of the other players
u−i in the problem stated in equation (Equation (3.2)) is a discounted optimal control
problem of the following form
H(x, u, λ, t) = f(x)(ui +
∑
j 6=i
uj)− cu2i (1− F (x)) + λ(ui + u−i)
x˙ = ui +
∑
j 6=i
uj
x(0) = 0
λ(T ) = 0
ui, x ∈ R+ ∀i
Using the Pontryagin maximum principle (Pontryagin, Boltyanskii, and Gamkrelidze
(1962)) in the version of Kamien and Schwartz (2012), we know that the necessary
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conditions for a maximum are
∂H
∂u
= 0 (3.8)
∂H
∂x
= rλ− λ˙ (3.9)
∂H
∂λ
= x˙ (3.10)
λ(T )x(T ) = 0 ⇒ λ(T ) = 0 (3.11)
with the Hamiltonian (Equation (3.8)), the equation of motion for the state variable
(Equation (3.9)), the equation of motion for the costate variable (Equation (3.10)) and
the transversality condition (Equation (3.11)) for x(T ) being free. In addition we can
see that the optimal control does not depend on the ujs of the other players but only
on the sum u−i :=
∑
j 6=i
uj. Therefore we get
ui =
f(x) + λ
2c (1− F (x))
λ˙ = rλ− f ′(x)(ui + u−i)− cu2i f(x)
x˙ = ui + u−i
x(0) = 0, λ(T ) = 0
From here on, we only consider symmetric equilibria, therefore we can replace u−i by
(n− 1)ui. Hence, necessary conditions for a best response are:
ui =
f(x) + λ
2c (1− F (x))
λ˙ = rλ− f ′(x)nui − cu2i f(x)
x˙ = nui
x(0) = 0, λ(T ) = 0.
Using ui we get
λ˙ = rλ− f ′(x)n
(
f(x) + λ
2c (1− F (x))
)
− c
(
f(x) + λ
2c (1− F (x))
)2
f(x)
x˙ = n
(
f(x) + λ
2c (1− F (x))
)
x(0) = 0, λ(T ) = 0.
So, the equation of motion for the costate and its time derivative are
λ =
2c
n
(1− F (x)) x˙− f(x)
λ˙ =
2c
n
(1− F (x)) x¨− 2c
n
f(x)x˙2 − f ′(x)x˙
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Using these, we get the boundary value problem:
(1− F (x)) x¨ = −nr
2c
f(x)− 1
2n
f(x)x˙2 + f(x)x˙2 + r (1− F (x)) x˙
x(0) = 0,
λ(T ) =
2c
n
(1− F (xT )) x˙T − f(xT ) = 0
Introducing the hazard rate h(x) := f(x)
1−F (x) , we have necessary conditions for Equa-
tion (3.2)
x¨ = −rn
2c
h(x) +
2n− 1
2n
h(x)x˙2 + rx˙
x(0) = 0,
x˙T =
n
2c
h(xT )
(3.12)
Or, in terms of the individual eﬀort:
u˙ = − r
2c
h(x) +
2n− 1
2
h(x)u2 + ru
uT =
1
2c
h(xT ),
(3.13)
which is a non-linear boundary value problem of the second order.
Existence, uniqueness and suﬃciency of the solution
Now that we have necessary conditions for the equilibrium eﬀort, we still have to check
for existence of the solution initial value problem and therefore the Nash equilibrium
and if the necessary conditions are suﬃcient.
Checking for existence and uniqueness ﬁrst gives us the following
Proposition 2 (Existence and Uniqueness). A solution to the initial value problem
from Equation (3.12) (and therefore also for Equation (3.13)) exists and is unique.
Proof. As ui : [0, T ] → R+ is continuous and maps from a compact space to a metric
space, we know that it is bounded. Therefore, r
2c
h(x) + 2n−1
2n
h(x)u2 − ru is Lipschitz-
continuous in u and t. Thus (by Picard-Lindelöf), we know that a unique solution to
the initial value problem for ui exists.
As x(t) =
t∫
0
nu(s) ds and x0 = 0 and u exists and is unique, x(t) also exists uniquely.
Now we know that the candidate solution from Equation (3.13) exists and is unique,
we have to show that it is in fact the maximum:
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Proposition 3 (Maximum). The candidate equilibrium strategy ui as deﬁned in Equa-
tion (3.13) is the solution to the maximization problem in Equation (3.2) and therefore
maximizes Vi.
Proof. Given Assumption 1 and Proposition 2 we know that ui exists, is unique and
continuous and we know that Vi is continuous in ui. Furthermore, we know that
(abusing the notation of ui = c as ui(t) = c ∀t ∈ [0, T ]):
ui = 0⇒ Vi = 0
∃ε > 0 : ui = ε⇒ Vi > 0
lim
ui→∞
Vi = −∞
Therefore Vi is concave in ui and, as it is also continuous in ui, the necessary conditions
for a maximum from Equation (3.13) are suﬃcient.
Therefore we have established the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an equilibrium
and have shown that, given Assumption 1, this equilibrium always exists uniquely, as
stated in Theorem 1.
3.6.3 Theorem 3 (Last-minute rush)
To prove Theorem 3, we use continuity of x to show that the negative part of u˙ vanishes
near the deadline and is therefore strictly positive.
Proof. As h(xt) is continuous in x, it is also continuous in t. We also know from
Theorem 1 that ut is continuous in t and that it satisﬁes
u˙ =
2n− 1
2
h(x)u2 − r(u− 1
2c
h(x)), uT =
1
2c
h(xT )
As ut and h(xt) are continuous in t, we know that:
⇒ lim
t→T
(u− 1
2c
h(x))→ (uT − 1
2c
h(xT )) = 0
Now deﬁne ε(t) = 2n−1
2r
h(xt)u
2
t . Then we know,
∃δ > 0 : tˆ := T − δ ⇒
(
ut − 1
2c
h(xt)
)
< ε(tˆ) =
2n− 1
2r
h(xtˆ)u
2
tˆ
⇒ u˙tˆ =
2n− 1
2
h(xtˆ)u
2 − r(utˆ −
1
2c
h(xtˆ)) > 0.
Therefore, we know that there is always an interval [tˆ, T ] in which the eﬀort is strictly
increasing.
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3.6.4 Lemma 1 (Asymmetric equilibria)
Proof. Assume there is an asymmetric equilibrium that is welfare maximizing. Then
∃i, t, j : ui(t) > uj(t). However, it would be possible to improve welfare by setting a new
u∗i (t) and u
∗
j(t) as follows: u
∗
i (t) = u
∗
j(t) =
ui(t)+ui(t)
2
as this does not change the overall
eﬀort (and therefore the chance of success) but reduces, due to the quadratic costs,
the combined expected costs of the project. Therefore, an asymmetric equilibrium can
never be welfare maximizing.
3.6.5 Theorem 2 (Social planner)
Applying similar methods as in Section 3.6.2, we get the welfare maximizing cumulative
eﬀort:
x¨ = −rn
2
2c
h(x) +
1
2
h(x)x˙2 + rx˙
x(0) = 0,
x˙T =
n2
2c
h(xT )
Or, in terms of instantaneous eﬀort u:
u˙ =
1
2
h(x)u2 + ru− nr
2c
h(x)
which reaches uT =
n
2c
h(xT ) at time T .
Furthermore, the properties derived in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 for the optimal
eﬀort in the game also apply to the solution of the social planner's problem (Theorem 2).
3.6.6 Constant hazard rate
For the exponential distribution with rate parameter λ, the solution from Theorem 1
evolves according to
u˙ =
2n− 1
2
λu2 + ru− r
2c
λ
uT =
1
2c
λ,
which has the following explicit solution:
u(t) =
λ
(
e
(t−T )
√
cr(cr+λ2(2n−1))
c + 1
)(
λ2(2n− 1) + cr −√cr (cr + λ2(2n− 1)))+ 2√cr (cr + λ2(2n− 1))
2c (cr + λ2(2n− 1))
((
1− 2cr+λ2(2n−1)
2
√
cr(cr+λ2(2n−1))
)
e
(t−T )
√
cr(cr+λ2(2n−1))
c + 2cr+λ
2(2n−1)
2
√
cr(cr+λ2(2n−1)) + 1
) .
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The welfare maximizing eﬀort has the following explicit solution
u(t) =
λne
−T
√
r
(
λ2n
c +r
)((
r −
√
r
(
λ2n
c + r
))
e
t
√
r
(
λ2n
c +r
)
−
(√
r
(
λ2n
c + r
)
+ r
)
e
T
√
r
(
λ2n
c +r
))
λ2n
(
e
(t−T )
√
r
(
λ2n
c +r
)
− 1
)
+ 2cr
(
e
(t−T )
√
r
(
λ2n
c +r
)
− 1
)
− 2√cr (cr + λ2n)(e(t−T )√r(λ2nc +r) + 1) .
Calculations show that the non-cooperative equilibrium eﬀort is always lower than the
welfare maximizing eﬀort.
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Probabilistic Transitivity in Sports1
4.1 Introduction
In many situations we are confronted with data about a certain set of objects which
only include an array of comparisons about two of these objects at a time. Then all
too often the task arises to ﬁnd the "fairest" or "most legitimate" ranking among all
of the objects in the considered set reaching from the "best" one to the "worst" one.
The probably most popular application of such paired comparisons is sports. In most
sports games two opponents face each other in a duel. The result can be a win for one
of the teams or, depending on the sport, also a tie.
An important attribute of a ranking is that it expresses a transitive relation between
all of its objects. This means that if object or team A precedes B and B precedes C, it
automatically implies that A precedes C. In contrast to this, paired comparison data
can include circular relations, which seem to be inconsistent with this property. In a
tournament it is possible that A beats B, B beats C, but C beats A. It is easy to
imagine that as the number of teams rises, the probability of the occurrence of such
inconsistencies rapidly increases. In the literature many suggestions have been made to
overcome these inconsistencies and ﬁnd a ranking with a good ﬁt according to diﬀerent
concepts. A good overview of the classical models for obtaining rankings from data
sets gives Brunk (1960). One approach that deserves attention is the one proposed by
Slater (1961). Here the observed number of inconsistencies (in the sense mentioned
above) is minimized. This nontrivial problem later became known as a particular form
of the so called linear ordering problem. For a good survey on the linear ordering
problem see for example Charon and Hudry (2010).
1Parts of this chapter can be found in Tiwisina and Külpmann (2014).
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The major issue concerning the mentioned approaches is that despite all of them having
some intuitive appeal, they seem to be rather arbitrary in ﬁnding the "right" ranking.
The diﬀerence of our approach is that we assume that there actually exists a correct
ranking. Of course we cannot directly observe it, but we can try to ﬁnd the ranking
which is most likely identical to it. To be more precise, we ﬁrst of all make the
assumption that the outcome of each match follows a trinomial distribution, with a
ﬁxed probability for a loss, a tie, and a win. These unobservable probabilities fulﬁll
a certain form of transitivity. Applying the respective conditions we can then use a
likelihood function to gauge the chance of the observed set of results given a particular
set of probabilities. Maximizing this likelihood function while fulﬁlling the transitivity
conditions answers the question about the most likely correct ranking.
In the literature there can be found plenty of works using the concepts of the so called
weak and strong stochastic transitivity. These are deﬁnitions, which transfer the very
intuitive concept of transitivity to the world of probabilities. Because in our model
we consider ties and also home/away asymmetries, we are forced to deﬁne our own
concept which goes beyond WST and SST.
At this point the optimization problem, which is the main object of the chapter, is
completely deﬁned by the set of probabilities for three outcomes for each game, the
likelihood function which shall be maximized, and ﬁnally the set of constraints im-
posed by the stochastic transitivity deﬁned above. We are not the ﬁrst authors trying
to ﬁnd a maximum likelihood ranking while applying probabilistic transitivity condi-
tions. Thompson and Remage (1964) propose a similar problem of ranking pairwisely
compared objects. The analysis is extended in Singh and Thompson (1968) by the
incorporation of ties. However, Thompson uses only constraints of WST.2 This con-
tributes a lot to the simplicity of the problem and enables Decani (1969) to formulate it
as a linear program and later propose in Decani (1972) a branch and bound algorithm
to solve the problem even more eﬃciently.
Unfortunately the new set of constraints make things much more complicated. Increas-
ing the number of teams leads to a huge number of constraints. And it is straightfor-
ward to see that the space of transitive probability sets of a particular dimension is not
convex. So it is not a surprise that state of the art solvers do not succeed in ﬁnding
the optimal solution to this non-linear, non-convex problem as soon as the number of
teams is increased to more than 5 or 6.
This is why we split up the problem in two parts. The ﬁrst one is to ﬁnd the probability
sets and the likelihood for a ﬁxed ranking and the second one is to ﬁnd the ranking
2After the incorporation of ties he naturally can't use the WST constraints, but has to alter his
concept. However, it still diﬀers substantially from ours which makes a comparison very diﬃcult.
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with the greatest likelihood.
When the goal is to ﬁnd probabilities for a ﬁxed ranking, while still sticking to the
transitivity deﬁnition, the constraints become much simpler.
The problem we arrive at is now very close to the so called isotonic regression problem
in which a set of probabilities needs to be estimated, while one knows their order
according to their magnitude (see Barlow and Brunk (1972) or Van Eeden (1996) for
an overview). A reference much closer to the subject of this chapter is Brunk (1955).
Here the random variables (in our case the match results) are assumed to follow a
distribution belonging to an exponential family. The single distribution parameter
follows a function depending monotonically on potentially multiple variables. These
variables would in this work correspond to the two teams that are playing. The very
eﬃcient method developed in this chapter later became known as the pool adjacent-
violators algorithm (PAVA). The major diﬀerence of Brunk's chapter to our approach
is that the trinomial distribution we will be using does not belong to the exponential
family he is referring to. It also has not one but two distribution parameters. So we
are very unfortunate to not being able to apply the PAVA. To be able to estimate not
only ordered binomial but also ordered multinomial distribution parameters Jewell and
Kalbﬂeisch (2004) developed a modiﬁcation of this algorithm, the so called m-PAVA.
This algorithm is technically able to solve our ﬁrst problem, but turns out to be very
ineﬃcient and slow. But there is an alternative. Lim, Wang, and Choi (2009) ﬁnd that
a program of the kind we are facing can be formulated as a geometric program, which
then can be transformed into a convex program. By applying state of the art interior
point solvers, we are then able to ﬁnd a solution very eﬃciently.3
The second part of the problem is more complicated. If we increase the number of
teams, the possible number of orderings rises very quickly. For 4 teams there are 24
possibilities, for 5 teams there are 120 and for 18 teams there are more than 6× 1015.
But even if we're not able to ﬁnd the optimal ranking, we are still able to compare
diﬀerent rankings created by the application of empirically relevant ranking systems.
And this is exactly what we do in the empirical subsection of the chapter. Among the
candidates are the classical "three points for a win" and "two points for a win" systems
from soccer and also the Elo system applied e.g. in chess.
To be able to make a good judgment about the true quality of the systems when
applied to diﬀerent sports, we develop a statistical test. It assumes the trueness of the
null hypothesis stating that one of two ranking systems under consideration is able to
ﬁnd the correct ordering. Then we estimate all the probabilities and simulate a test
3In Lim, Wang, and Choi (2009) investigations geometric programming is more than 150 times
faster.
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statistic. Combined with the empirically observed likelihoods, we are then ideally able
to reject the null hypothesis which lets us state that here the considered system is not
able to generate the correct ranking.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2 the formal model is introduced. In
Section 4.4 the problem solution for a known ranking is described, before in Section 4.5
we discuss strategies for ﬁnding optimal rankings. The next two sections then describe
the sports data and provide a thorough empirical analysis. Section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Setup
Many sports have in common that n teams or individuals are competing in a number
of repeated one-on-one games. The results of these games should be aggregated to one
ﬁnal complete ranking. Let pij be the probability that team i beats team j.
Naturally, we must have ∀ i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
pij ∈ [0, 1]
pij + pji ≤ 1 (4.1)
It can be observed that playing at home (meaning in i's stadium) and playing away
makes a diﬀerence to the winning probabilities. Therefore we introduce diﬀerent prob-
abilities for at home and away games: pijh is the probability that i beats j at home and
pjia that team j wins against i at i's stadium.
Therefore Equation (4.1) changes to
pijh + pjia ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Since in many sports there exists the possibility of a draw, there is no strict equality.
In fact, the probability of a draw is
qijh = qjia = 1− pijh − pjia.
In this chapter, we want to make only one assumption concerning a set of those proba-
bilities. This assumption is based on the concept of weak and strong stochastic transi-
tivity, which formalizes the very intuitive thought that if team i is better than team j
and j is better than k then i has to be better than k, as well. In a model of symmetric
paired comparison without ties this can be translated fairly easily into stochastic terms.
pij ≥ 1/2 ∧ pjk ≥ 1/2 =⇒ pik ≥ 1/2 (WST)
pij ≥ 1/2 ∧ pjk ≥ 1/2 =⇒ pik ≥ max{pij, pjk} (SST)
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Where Equation (SST) is equivalent to
pij ≥ 1/2 =⇒ pik ≥ pjk.
The concept of stochastic transitivity has been widely used in the literature on paired
comparisons, especially in the 60s and 70s (see e.g. Tversky (1969), Chung and Hwang
(1978), Morrison (1963) or Davidson and Solomon (1973)).
The introduction of ties and in addition to that the introduction of a home/away
asymmetry forbid to use this concept directly. Equation (SST) is best interpreted by
saying "if team i is better than team j, it has to have a higher chance of beating any
third team k". But in a world with draws and home advantage we cannot interpret
"being better" as pij > 1/2. Thats why one has to alter this point. This is done in the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6 (Transitivity). A set of probabilities will be called transitive if the fol-
lowing holds for every i, j, k, l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, x, y ∈ {a, h} and ∃i′, j′, k′, l′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
pikx ≥ pjkx ⇔ pily ≥ pjly
pkix ≥ pkjx ⇔ pliy ≥ pljy
pi′k′x > pj′k′x ⇒ pl′j′x > pl′i′x
(4.2)
The set of transitive probability sets will be called T .
The ﬁrst proposition shows that our concept is in fact a generalization of SST.
Proposition 4. Deﬁnition 6 is, when assigning 0 to all draw probabilities and ignoring
away/home diﬀerentiation, equivalent to Equation (SST).
Deﬁnition 7 (Transitive Ranking). A ranking will be called transitive if for all i ranked
above j the following holds:
pikh ≥ pjkh, pkih ≤ pkjh, pika ≥ pjka, pkia ≤ pkja ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . , n}\i, j
The set of probability sets according to this deﬁnition will be called T ′.
The fact that a transitive ranking has a set of transitive probabilities and every set of
transitive probabilities has a transitive ranking is established in the following Proposi-
tion.
Proposition 5. A set of probabilities P is in T if and only if it is in T ′.
For the proofs of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 see Section 4.10.1.
The structure of the constraints and hereby the problem we have to solve becomes
clearer, if we write down the set of pijx values in matrix form and add the constraints
using one particular ranking.
70
CHAPTER 4. PROBABILISTIC TRANSITIVITY IN SPORTS

∗ ≤ p12h ≤ p13h ≤ · · · ≤ p1nh
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
p21h ≤ ∗ ≤ p23h ≤ · · · ≤ p2nh
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
· · · ≤ · · · ≤ · · · ≤ · · · ≤ · · ·
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
pn1h≤ pn2h≤ pn3h≤ · · · ≤ ∗

,

∗ ≤ p12a ≤ p13a ≤ · · · ≤ p1na
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
p21a ≤ ∗ ≤ p23a ≤ · · · ≤ p2na
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
· · · ≤ · · · ≤ · · · ≤ · · · ≤ · · ·
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
pn1a≤ pn2a≤ pn3a≤ · · · ≤ ∗

Figure 4.1: Transitivity matrices for home and away probabilities
4.3 The optimization problem
By assumption, each outcome in a set of paired comparisons is trinomially distributed.
The probability distribution is
Pr{xij = wij} = pwijhijh pwjiajia (1− pijh − pjia)mij−wijh−wjia (4.3)
where wij is the vector consisting of the elements wijh and wjia. xij is the analogously
deﬁned vector of a realization of the corresponding random variable. Equation (4.3)
tells us the probability of a certain outcome of a game between two particular teams
in one particular stadium. By taking the exponential of the natural logarithm of the
left side, we can write the above equation as
Pr{xij = wij} = exp(wijh ln(pijh) + wjia ln(pjia)
+ (mij − wijh − wjia) ln(1− pijh − pjia))
Let
F [xij, pij] := wijh ln(pijh) + wjia ln(pjia) + (mij − wijh − wjia) ln(mij − pijh − pjia)
The likelihood of a set of particular results to occur will be
Pr{(xij, . . . , xi′j′) = (wij, . . . , wi′j′)} = exp(F [wij, pij] + · · ·+ F [wi′j′ , pi′j′ ])
Let E be the set of all valid (i, j) combinations E = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, i 6= j}. Then
Equation (4.2) implies that, in order to maximize the likelihood of a set of outcomes,
we have to solve the following maximization problem
max
pij
J [p] =
∑
(i,j)∈E
F [wij, pij] s.t. {pijx | (i, j) ∈ E, x ∈ {h, a}} ∈ T
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This is a rather complicated optimization problem, ﬁrst because the objective function
(the log of the likelihood function) is not linear, and second because we have a huge
number of non-linear constraints, which make the space we are dealing with highly
convoluted and non-convex. We can achieve convexity by ﬁxing a particular ranking
of teams. In this case we face a total number of 2(2(n − 2)n + (n − 1)) constraints.
Note that a simple transformation of parameters cannot help us making the problem
convex. Also it cannot make the problem linear after ﬁxing a ranking. In this highly
simpliﬁed case, where the untransformed constraints can be expressed in a linear form,
a logarithmic transformation would make the objective function linear but take away
linearity from the constraints. More details on this will follow in Section 4.4.2.
4.4 Optimization under a known ranking
Note that the probabilities depicted in Figure 4.1 are only the constraints that apply
for one ranking. So the optimization problem can be split into ﬁrst ﬁnding the optimal
(i.e., likelihood maximizing) probabilities that satisfy the monotonicity constraints from
the matrix and second ﬁnding the best ranking. It should become clear that if we
consider the indices as variables of the functions ph(i, j) and pa(i, j), then this function
is monotone non-increasing in the ﬁrst variable and monotone nondecreasing in the
second one. In the considered case the two matrices are only insofar dependent on
each other as the sum of an element of the upper right half of the ﬁrst matrix depicted
in Figure Figure 4.1 and the corresponding element of the bottom left half of the second
matrix has to be less than or equal to unity.
4.4.1 Transitivity without draws
Now, let us again compare the original problem to the one in the much simpler case
without ties. Here, the problem of estimating the probabilities is much easier. Given the
above assumptions, the number of wins when two teams play each other a particular
amount of times follows an elementary binomial distribution. This instant allowed
Brunk (1955) to develop an algorithmic approach, building the foundation of what
later became known as the Pool Adjacent Violators Algorithm (PAVA). See also Brunk
(1960) for an application to paired comparisons. It follows a short description of the
estimation procedure.
A lower interval is the set of all points (i, j) for which i ≥ i′, j ≤ j′. So it includes a
point in one of the above matrices as well as all the points in its south-west quadrant.
An upper interval is analogously deﬁned. A lower layer is a union of lower intervals
and an upper layer is a union of upper intervals.
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The procedure is now to ﬁnd the largest upper layer within which the average number
of wins is maximized. That is, we have to ﬁnd an upper layer with the property that
the number of wins divided by the number of games it comprises is maximal. For each
pij in this layer the maximum likelihood estimate under the monotonicity constraints
we deﬁned is this average number of wins. Next step is to repeat the procedure on the
remaining set of the matrix of results.
To illustrate the approach, consider the following example of a tournament of 4 teams
in which each two teams played each other once. (For simplicity we only consider home
games of the row teams, here.)
Figure 4.2: PAVA example: Result matrix and p-Matrix
On the left there is the matrix of tournament results. The solid line shows the ﬁrst
upper layer with an average number of wins of 3/5, giving us the p-value listed in the
right matrix. The second layer includes all the numbers above and to the right of the
dashed line. Here the average value is 1/2 and so on. Having the p-Matrix at hand, it is
straightforward to calculate the maximum likelihood of the tournament to be 0.03888.
Please note that this algorithm, while being very eﬃcient at ﬁnding the probabilities
for a ﬁxed ranking, does not help ﬁnding the optimal permutation of the teams. To
ﬁnd it, one is still forced to apply this algorithm 4! = 24 times for this example.
Unfortunately including the chance of draws forbids to use this very simple and eﬃcient
procedure. In the next subsection we show how to arrive at a solution nonetheless.
4.4.2 Solution process for the case including draws
Again focusing on the part of the problem where the ranking is already ﬁxed, allowing
for ties makes the solution procedure much more complicated. Now, the task is not
to estimate ordered binomial, but rather ordered trinomial distribution parameters.
Jewell and Kalbﬂeisch (2004) developed an extension of the PAVA algorithm discussed
above. The Authors call this algorithm the modiﬁed- or m-PAVA algorithm. In the
process the problem is iteratively broken down into many one dimensional optimization
problems. Since the number of these subproblems grows very quickly with the number
of teams and also the number of adjacent violators, the required computational eﬀort
also does. This is the main reason for Lim, Wang, and Choi (2009) to reconsider
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the problem, ﬁnding that it can be formulated as a geometric program. Then it can
be transformed into a convex optimization problem, for which one can ﬁnd a global
solution very eﬃciently with the help of e.g. interior-point algorithms. Lim, Wang, and
Choi (2009) compare the computational eﬃciency of the two approaches and ﬁnd that
geometric programming is much faster than the m-PAVA algorithm. These ﬁndings
facilitate the choice for us in this chapter.
Let us take a look at it in detail. We deﬁne wijh to be the empirically observed number
of times team i beats team j at home and tijh = tjia as the number of times team i
ties team j. Let mij be the total number of games between i and j at i's stadium.
Consider the optimization problem for a ﬁxed ranking in its raw form.4
min
p
∏
(i,j)∈E
p
−wijh
ijh p
−wjia
jia (1− pijh − pjia)−(mij−wijh−wjia)
s.t.
pijx
pikx
≤ 1 ∀ (i, j) ∈ E, (i, k) ∈ E, j  k, x ∈ {h, a}
pijh + pjia ≤ 1
pijx ≥ 0
(4.4)
This is a geometric program. The objective function as well as the left side of the ﬁrst
constraint are monomial and the left side of the second constraint are polynomials. The
third constraint reﬂects the fact that the domain of our objective function is positive,
as in all geometric programs. The program can easily be transformed to a convex
optimization problem.
min
p
∑
(i,j)∈E
−wijh ln(pijh)− wjia ln(pjia)− (mij − wijh − wjia) ln(1− pijh − pjia)
s.t. ln(pijx)− ln(pikx) ≤ 0 ∀ (i, j) ∈ E, (i, k) ∈ E, j  k, x ∈ {h, a}
ln(eln(pijh) + eln(pjia)) ≤ 0
It is straightforward to show that the logarithm of a posynomial is convex in ln(x),
which proves the fact that this is indeed a convex program. To solve this kind of
program we make use of the software package IPOPT (see Wächter and Biegler (2006)).
In addition to the program it requires the input of the Jacobian and Hessian matrices
of the constraints. It then applies an interior point algorithm and solves our problem
very eﬃciently, given a ﬁxed ranking. This allows us to compare diﬀerent ranking
systems.
4The only change made is the conversion to a minimization instead of a maximization problem.
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4.5 Ranking methods
4.5.1 The Linear Ordering Problem
At this point, before proceeding with our eﬀorts of ﬁnding solutions to the proposed
problem, it makes sense to consider a related, but as we will see, clearly diﬀerent prob-
lem. As one of the classical combinatorial optimization problems the linear ordering
problem (LOP) attracted many authors resulting in a huge amount of literature on it.
See for example Marti and Reinelt (2011) for a good introduction to the problem as
well as a review of suitable algorithms. Also feel referred to Charon and Hudry (2010)
for a detailed survey.
If one is given a complete directed graph Dn = (Vn, An) with arc weights cij for ev-
ery ordered pair (i, j) ∈ Vn × Vn, the linear ordering problem consists of ﬁnding an
acyclic tournament T (which corresponds to a permutation of the set of objects or
teams), which maximizes the sum of the arcs which are in agreement with the direc-
tion of the arcs from Dn. So the sum
∑
(i,j)∈T cij has to be maximal. Equivalently one
could formulate the problem as minimizing the so called remoteness corresponding to
minimizing the arc weights pointing in the opposite direction.
A more illustrative representation of the problem is the maximization of the sum of
superdiagonal elements in a matrix by manipulating the row/column ordering. This is
the so called Triangulation Problem.
The reader might already be able to grasp a sense of similarity here. To establish
a direct connection between the LOP and the problem dealt with in this chapter,
consider a situation where we ﬁx the probabilities of wins and losses at homogeneous
values below and above the diagonal of the matrix independently of which teams are
in question. This means we set pijh = ph above diagonal and pijh = ph below it and
analogously for the away probabilities. Let us consider the case where ph > ph and
pa > pa. Remember that the goal is to maximize∑
(ij)∈E
wijh ln(pijh) + wjia ln(pjia) + (1− wijh − wjia) ln(1− pijh − pjia)
=
∑
(ij)∈E
wijh ln(ph) + wija ln(pa) + tijh ln(1− ph − pa)
+
∑
(ij)∈E
wijh ln(ph) + wija ln(pa) + tijh ln(1− ph − pa)
where E and E represent the sets of elements above and below the diagonals, respec-
tively.
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The results of a particular team in his two games against a particular opponent makes
a certain contribution to the sum. This contribution might be higher because it is
multiplied by higher probabilities if the records are superdiagonal. So we are confronted
with a triangulation problem just like the one described above. Many Authors suggest
an application of the LOP in sports rankings (see e.g. Marti and Reinelt (2011)). And
since it indeed seems well suited for our purposes, we will include it in the analysis.
4.5.2 Branch and Bound Algorithm
Branch and Bound Algorithms are particularly well suited for combinatorial optimiza-
tion problems. As opposed to the other methods we are proposing, this one leads with
certainty to the optimal ranking. For an early survey on Branch and Bound methods
feel referred to Lawler and Wood (1966).
The following steps describe the execution of the algorithm:
1. Take the next team from the list of all teams
2. Put it in the list of previously selected teams at each possible position
3. For each position calculate an upper bound L above which the likelihood cannot
rise going further down the tree (i.e., after all teams were inserted)
4. Leave the team at the position with the highest upper bound
5. If all teams are inserted go to 6., otherwise go to 1.
6. Compare the likelihood to the best one found so far
7. Cut of the tree at all nodes where L is below the best likelihood
8. Go to the best of the lowest hanging nodes that could not be deleted and start
with 1. from there
Before asking how the upper bound estimate L is calculated, lets ﬁrst focus on the
procedure itself. To understand it better, consider a simple example of three teams
"a" "b" and "c".
We start by inserting team "a". The upper bound for the log likelihood at this point
is still 0, which is indicated in brackets in Figure 4.3. Then team "b" is added at each
possible position. We see upper bounds of -1.3 and 0, respectively. So we continue by
leaving "b" at the second position and then insert team c at each possible location.
Since the example only includes three teams, we can now calculate the value of the
real objective function instead of calculating L the way it was done previously. The
highest value of the objective function is found using the ordering "bac". This value of
-1.2 now enables us to cut of all hanging nodes, which have an upper bound below -1.2.
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a(0)
ba ab(-1.3) (0)
cab bca bac(-2.4) (-1.9) (-1.2)
Figure 4.3: Branch and Bound Algorithm: An example
So we cut of the tree at "ba", since there is no way, we could get a better likelihood
going down the tree from this node. It is easy to see how the procedure can save
computational eﬀort (even in this tiny example) compared to calculating the MLE for
all permutations.
The upper bound L is calculated as follows. First the optimization problem (for a ﬁxed
ranking) is applied to the teams that have been inserted so far.
Lemma 2. Adding an additional team into an existing ranking without changing the
relative order of the already existing teams can not increase L.
Proof. It is trivial to see that adding a variable (team) to the maximization problem
without adding additional constraints (results) does not change the maximum like-
lihood (i.e., we are multiplying by 1). Now, adding additional constraints without
changing the objective function or changing the other constraints can never increase
the maximum likelihood and therefore the new L has to be less or equal to the L with
1 team less.
At this stage we could already use this maximum likelihood of the considered subset
of teams for L. But there is a way to reduce the upper bound even further and
thereby make the algorithm a lot more eﬃcient. For each team that is still pending
to be inserted we already know a subset of the constraints that will be applied to the
corresponding probabilities when going further down the tree, no matter where this
particular team will be inserted. Consider a situation where teams 1, ..., k have already
been inserted. Now, for each team l ∈ {k + 1, ..., n} we know that pilx ≤ pi′lx and
plix ≥ pli′x for every i, i′ ∈ {1, ..., k} and x ∈ {h, a} such that i is ranked above i′. For
k = 3 this is depicted in Figure 4.4.
For every team that has not been inserted yet, we know this subset of constraints. So
we have another optimization problem for each team. The results of these optimization
problems (, having the form of log likelihood values) can be added to the value L.
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Figure 4.4: Calculation of the upper bound L
As mentioned, the algorithm leads for sure to the optimal ordering. The drawback
is that despite of the fairly sophisticated upper bound that we are suggesting, it is
still not eﬃcient enough to be applied to tournaments with more than 11-12 teams5.
Nevertheless the branch and bound algorithm deserves to be included in the empirical
subsection of this chapter.
4.5.3 Tabu Search
The third ranking algorithm we are suggesting is a heuristic search method. The
advantage of tabu search lies in the combination of local search and a diversiﬁcation
mechanism. The local search systematically browses through neighborhood solutions,
checking for a possible improvement of the objective value. That the algorithm doesn't
get stuck in local optima is assured by a memory structure, avoiding previously visited
regions of the solution space, giving a tendency for diversiﬁcation. A reference with a
related application is Laguna, Marti, and Campos (1999).
The algorithm works as follows:
1. Start from a randomly generated order of teams (call it ρ)
2. Calculate the maximum likelihood for the current ranking L(ρ)
3. Randomly select a team that is not on the "Tabu List" and remove it from the
order
4. Insert the team at position i and calculate diﬀerence between the maximum
likelihood of the new and the original ranking: MoveV alue = L(ρ′)− L(ρ)
5. Repeat 4. for 1 ≤ i ≤ n except for the original position
6. Insert the team at the position with the highest MoveV alue
7. Put the team on the "Tabu List" so that it won't be selected for the next
"TabuTenure" iterations
8. Go to 2.
5Depending on the structure of results in the tournament, as well as the users patience.
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Basically what the algorithm does is taking a team from the ranking and trying out
every possible position for it, except for the original one. Important is that the best
among the new positions is selected even if the "MoveV alue" is negative. Diﬀerent
convergence criteria are possible for the procedure. Since in our analysis the computa-
tional eﬀort in each iteration is fairly large, we use a ﬁxed number of iterations for the
algorithm, so that we can best control the amount of time it takes for the algorithm
to ﬁnish.
4.5.4 Popular ranking methods
Finally, we want to take a more practical approach and compare diﬀerent ranking
systems, which have been used in diﬀerent ﬁelds of sports. We chose the 3 point
system (also known as "Three points for a win"), which awards zero points for a loss,
one point for a draw and three points for a win. The sum of the points together with
the goal diﬀerence as a tie breaker then decides upon the ranking. This system has
been used in most soccer leagues since it was oﬃcially adopted in 1995 by FIFA.6
Before the 3 point system was introduced, the analogously structured 2 point system
had been widely used in soccer. Here the only diﬀerence is that two instead of three
points are awarded for a win.
These two systems are fairly easy to apply and (unfortunately) also very similar to each
other. As a third candidate for a ranking scheme, we use the Elo rating system. The Elo
rating system is a system invented by Elo (1978) originally intended as a rating system
for chess. Today it is not only used as for diﬀerent chess organizations, including the
FIDE and the United States Chess Federation, but also the European Go Federation,
many diﬀerent computer games and even the National Collegiate Athletic Association,
the organization which is responsible for the organization of many American college
sport programs, notable college football and college basketball. The main diﬀerences
to the three points for a win is that it factors in the strength of the opponent: winning
against a strong opponent yields more points than winning against a weak one. This
results in the major weakness for our needs: a relatively high number of games is
needed to give meaningful results and the order in which the teams play matters a lot.
6England introduced the system already in 1981. The ﬁrst time it was used internationally was in
the 1994 World Cup ﬁnals.
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4.6 Comparing the explanatory power of rank-
ings
To further enhance our comparative analysis of ranking systems, we will apply a statis-
tical hypothesis test. In this test two ranking systems are compared, call them system
a and system b. We solve problem Equation (4.4) for both rankings. The p-matrix
calculated with the constraints generated by one of the rankings, say system a, will
yield a likelihood for the observed season at least as great as the one generated by the
other one, say system b.
L(Pˆa(w)|w) ≥ L(Pˆb(w)|w)
where Pˆa(w) and Pˆb(w) are the estimated p-matrices. So we could say, a allows one to
calculate a p-matrix with a higher explanatory value, so it must be the better system.
But in fact, it might have happened by chance, that this ranking system performed
better than the other one. The central question concerns the degree of the odds that
a performed better than b by the observed amount. Let us deﬁne the likelihood ratio
as follows
LRa,b = log(L(Pˆa(w)|w)))− log(L(Pˆb(w)|w)).
We assume a Hypothesis H0 stating that "b is the correct ranking system". Correct
means that it allows us to estimate the right p-values. Using these probabilities for each
match, we simulate a complete season and get a new tournament wˆ for which we again
calculate the likelihoods given Pˆa(w) and Pˆb(w). This way a few thousand seasons are
simulated and we receive a distribution over the diﬀerence of the log-likelihood. In the
ideal case, the probability (suggested by the simulated distribution) of the observed
diﬀerence between the likelihoods is small enough to be able to reject H0 with this very
test size α.
P [LRa,b(wˆ) ≤ LRa,b(w)] < α
So, roughly what we do is assuming that one of the systems is correct, and then we
try to reject this hypothesis, by showing that the probability for another system to be
as much better as empirically observed is very small.
The weakness of this approach is pretty obvious. We are only able to reject the hy-
pothesis that a particular system is perfectly correct. Even though the data allows us
to make a guess about it, the test does not allow us to make a statement about which
of the two systems in consideration is actually better. So in fact, both of the systems
might be incorrect, but we are only able to reveal the inadequacy of one of them.
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4.7 Data
We obtain the data from diﬀerent sources. For soccer we focus on the German Bun-
desliga and the British Premier League. For the former we have data from the seasons
1968/69 till 2012/13, for the latter the sample from the seasons 1997/98 till 2012/2013.
Additionally, we included the season 2012/2013 from the the Austrian Bundesliga, be-
cause of its advantage of having only 10 Teams. The scores for all matches, which
are translated to win/draw/loss data, are obtained from the website www.kicker.de.
Notable about the soccer data is that each team plays each other team exactly once at
home and once away in each season. This introduces a symmetry to the data which,
even though it is not necessary, might be considered as desirable and certainly inﬂu-
ences the results of our analysis.
Regarding tennis, we face a diﬀerent situation. Since there is no league of players in
which each player faces another one a ﬁxed number of times per season we have to go
a diﬀerent way. We will focus only on the top 10 players according to the oﬃcial ATP
ranking at the end of each year (obtained from http://www.atpworldtour.com). Then
we collect the data for all the ATPmatches played in this season from http://www.tennis-
data.co.uk. Of course these data sets will be highly asymmetric, because some players
play against each other more that once, and some might not face each other at all
during a season. Another special fact about the tennis data is that we don't have a
real home away situation.7 Even more importantly, in tennis there is no possibility
of ties. So we face only a binomial distribution for the outcome of each match which
considerably facilitates the optimization procedure.
Concerning American football, we will focus exclusively on the NFL. We have data on
the scores of every NFL game since 1978 from the website http://www.re
pole.com/sun4cast/data.html. The NFL comprises from 28 in the season 1978 to 32
teams in 2012. This is by far the largest group of teams. Almost naturally it follows that
among the samples there is a huge number of teams that don't face each other during
a season. Which team is playing which is determined by a complicated system, which
shall not be further discussed here. In football draws are possible, but only happen
very rarely. Along with the fact that American football enjoys great popularity, this
makes NFL data very interesting for our analysis.
7Of course some players might feel more at home when a tournament is taking place in their country
of origin. But since this is very diﬀerent to the situation of a team playing in its very own stadium in
its city, we will assume that every game takes place on neutral ground.
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4.8 Empirical analysis
We now want to apply the presented methods to real data from sports. Countless
diﬀerent types of sports are imaginable and probably the readers preferences for what
he would like to see in this section are very heterogeneous. Nevertheless for reasons of
space we want to focus on three types, namely soccer, tennis and American football.
The main questions we seek to answer are, "Is there a tendency for one of the ranking
schemes to be superior to the others according to the criterion we deﬁned?", "If yes,
which one is it?", "Does it depend on the type of sport?" and ﬁnally "Are we able to
improve on the rankings found by the simple ranking methods using one of the algo-
rithms presented in Section 4.5?"
4.8.1 Soccer in Austria: Finding an optimal ranking
With the branch and bound algorithm we ﬁnd our selves equipped with a very powerful
instrument to ﬁnd the optimal ranking. Unfortunately this algorithm can only be
applied to sets of teams that have a limited size. The ﬁrst object of our investigation
shall be the Austrian Bundesliga. Its size of 10 teams enables us to apply the discussed
bnb-method. During a season each team plays against each other team four times, two
times at home and two times away. This is diﬀerent from most other soccer leagues,
but doesn't increase the computational complexity by much. Here, we consider the
season 2012/2013. To draw a ﬁrst comparison between the performances of the other
ranking schemes, Table 4.1 shows the maximum likelihoods that have been calculated.
Method BnB 2-Point 3-Point LOP Elo Tabu-Search
MLE -129.844 -131.742 -135.561 -140.024 -131.703 -130.465
Table 4.1: Log likelihood values for the Austrian Bundesliga 12/13
While the ranking corresponding to the solution to the linear ordering problem gives a
relatively low likelihood, the two point system as well as the Elo-system seem to explain
the results a lot better. Nevertheless, none of the systems generates the optimal ranking
found by the branch and bound algorithm. The ranking produced by the Tabu Search
gives a higher likelihood than all the systems, but still is not the optimal one.
Figure 4.5 compares the optimal ranking that we found with the actually applied
order, namely the 3-Point ranking. One can see that there are indeed some diﬀerences.
Perhaps most striking is that in this season SV Mattersburg was relegated, while in the
optimal ranking Wacker Insbruck would have been relegated. This team was actually
ranked 8th.
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3 P Optimal
Figure 4.5: Rankings resulting from 3-point system and Branch and Bound algorithm
Unfortunately most leagues are larger than the Austrian Bundesliga. The resulting
computational eﬀort makes it virtually impossible for us to ﬁnd optimal rankings.
which is why in the next subsection we focus on the other methods and compare the
diﬀerent ranking schemes across panel data from diﬀerent leagues in diﬀerent sports.
4.8.2 Ranking systems and maximum likelihood estimates
To give the reader an impression of how a matrix of estimated outcome probabilities
for each game looks like after the optimization, Figure 4.6 depicts the probabilities for
home game wins for the Bundesliga season 2012/13 estimated using the "three points
for a win" system.
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Figure 4.6: MLE for pijh using 3-point system
Generally, a striking feature about the structure of the estimated probably matrices
is the occurrence of homogeneous values in certain areas of the matrix, reminding of
the layer structure discussed in Section 4.4.1. Remarkable in this particular matrix is
the large number of "1"s in the upper right corner and "0"s in the lower left corner.
The reader might be tempted to argue that these values are fairly unrealistic, because
intuition tells us that even if the strongest team plays the weakest one, in the current
case Bayern München against Greuter Fürth, the chance of the former to win against
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the latter will be high, but never 100%. The point is that we only hold this intuition,
because probably at some point in the past we have seen top teams occasionally loosing
against teams that were ranked very low. But since this kind of information is not part
of our estimation procedure, it is only natural that estimates look like this.8
Next, we want to try to improve this ranking by using one of the algorithms presented
in Section 4.5. Unfortunately the sample of 18 teams is too large for an application of
the branch and bound algorithm, which would technically allow us to ﬁnd the optimal
ranking. So we use the Tabu search method, which we run for 100 iterations. The
resulting ordering as well as the corresponding maximum likelihoods are shown in
Figure 4.7.
3 P TabuSearch
Figure 4.7: Rankings resulting from 3-point system and Tabu Search
The Tabu Search ﬁnds a ranking that is partly very diﬀerent from the one determined
using the 3-point system. The biggest diﬀerence is the position of "Mainz 05" jumping
from the 13th position to the 4th. The cause of this diﬀerence can only be that "Mainz
05" has won the matches in this season that were particularly important in the sense of
being in accordance with the team having fairly high winning probabilities in general.
However, despite of diﬀerences in parts, a great similarity between the rankings can be
observed. This similarity can be measured using Spearman's rank correlation coeﬃcient
deﬁned as ρ = 1− 6
∑
(ri−si)2
n(n2−1) with ri being the original (3 point) ranking of team i and
si the ranking with the highest maximum likelihood as calculated with the Tabu Search
algorithm. The correlation between the 3-point ranking and the one found by the Tabu
Search is indeed fairly high with a value of about 0.87616. The diﬀerence between the
8We have to add, that in case the reader has seen Bayern München play in the season 2012/13, he
most certainly would agree that estimating some probabilities in the right of the upmost row with a
value of 1 most probably only involves a very small error.
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maximum likelihood values however, is in fact very large. The probabilities found using
the Tabu Search ranking make the observed season 3318 times more likely compared
to the probabilities found using the 3 point ranking.
As mentioned above, we have data not only on this one Bundesliga season, but on the
ones from the last 50 years.9 For every season that we have data on, we calculated
the maximum likelihood p-matrices as well as the objective function values using the
"2 points for a win", the "3 points for a win", Elo system and the ranking from the
solution to the linear ordering problem. Finally, we used the Tabu search method to
ﬁnd out, whether or not one is able to improve on one or all of the ranking schemes.
Because from season to season the likelihood values ﬂuctuate heavily, it makes sense
to use the likelihood found by one of the systems as a reference value and plot the
diﬀerences to these values in a diagram. As opposed to just plotting the absolute
likelihoods of every system in each year, this technique allows us to better compare the
quality of the rankings throughout the panel data. The system of reference will be "2
points for a win".
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Figure 4.8 (a) and (b) reveal that the two and three point systems are in fact very
close in the maximum likelihoods they "produce". This is not least because in most
cases the rankings determined by the two systems only diﬀer in a few spots. And if the
rankings do not diﬀer much, it's only natural that the likelihood values won't be very
far apart either. The two point system allows for a calculation of p-matrices that make
the observed seasons on average across the Bundesliga samples by about 9.8% more
likely than when using the three point system. In the Premier League the three point
system has a 5.2% higher explanatory power. The Elo-system also gives us likelihoods
9Because in the seasons 1963/64, 1964/65 and 1991/92 the number of teams in the Bundesliga was
diﬀerent from 18, we excluded these seasons from the sample. Sacriﬁcing these three data points for
a higher comparability seems reasonable.
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Figure 4.8: Maximum Likelihoods for Bundesliga and Premier League panel data
in the same range, indicated by the green lines. Actually this is a bit of a surprise,
since there were some hopes that the intuitively very reasonable mechanism of getting
more points for winning against relatively strong opponents would enable us to explain
the observed results better. Still it is not worse than the conventional two and three
point systems. But because of its higher complexity we clearly refrain from making a
recommendation for using this system. The ranking resulting from solving the linear
ordering problem is by far the worst performer in the diagram. One observes it to yield
likelihoods that are on average more that 1000 times smaller that the ones from the
two point system. So we have to clearly reject the suggestion for a possible application
of the LOP in soccer that has been made in the literature.
Another striking feature about the graphs is the position of the likelihood curves corre-
sponding to the tabu search. The heuristic algorithm is able to improve on every single
ranking from the sample, except for the Premier League seasons 04/05 and 05/06. On
average it helps to explain the results about 457 times better. The graph shows us
that even though the simple ranking schemes produce fairly "good" orderings in the
sense of a high correlation (as seen above), they are far away from being the most likely
correct ones.
Next, Figure 4.9 shows the analogue results for the tennis panel data from the last
14 years. The ﬁrst thing to note is that the two and three point systems produce the
same likelihoods throughout the whole sample, which is why in this graph there is no
curve comparing the two, since it would lie on the x-axis. The reason for this is that in
tennis we do not have draws, so in both systems the players are only ranked according
to their number of victories. In Figure 4.9, in addition to the curves from Figure 4.8,
the likelihoods from the oﬃcial ATP ranking from the end of each year are listed.
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Figure 4.9: Maximum Likelihoods for ATP panel data
This ranking is determined by awarding diﬀerent amounts of points for a stage that
is reached in the Grand Slam Tournaments, the ATP World Tour Finals, the Masters
1000, Olympics etc. Of course this method is very sophisticated and includes also the
results of the matches of the top 10 players against others that might not be in the
top 10. This data is not part of the other systems we are analyzing. According to the
criterion of this work, the ATP ranking performs fairly bad in explaining the observed
results. Interestingly in this tennis sample, the linear ordering ranking produces fairly
high likelihoods, in fact on average higher ones than the n-point and Elo system. Again,
in every year the tabu search algorithm is able to improve on all of the discussed
rankings.
Finally, Figure 4.10 illustrates the results form the same calculations as above, now for
American football results from the National Football League in the US. There is little
diﬀerence between 2- and 3 point systems, because draws are very unlikely to occur.
However, the 3 point system is almost at every point at least as good as the 2 point
system. The LOP and Elo systems operate in the same range of likelihoods as well.
With NFL data, applying the tabu search is more eﬀortful and thus takes more time
for the same number of iterations, because of the higher number of teams. However,
again, the tabu search improves upon all the rankings in the sample.
In general, the diﬀerence in the relative likelihoods when applying the Elo/LOP system
and the n-point systems between soccer on the one hand and tennis and American
football on the other could be due to the heterogeneity in the number of games played
between the teams in tennis and football as opposed to the symmetric situation in
soccer. Certainly a system like "two points for a win" doesn't seem to be particularly
well suited in a situation where teams play diﬀerent amounts of matches. And as
87
CHAPTER 4. PROBABILISTIC TRANSITIVITY IN SPORTS
-­‐15	  
-­‐10	  
-­‐5	  
0	  
5	  
10	  
15	  
20	  
25	  
30	  
78	   79	   80	   81	   82	   83	   84	   85	   86	   87	   88	   89	   90	   91	   92	   93	   94	   95	   96	   97	   98	   99	   100	   101	   102	   103	   104	   105	   106	   107	   108	   109	   110	   111	   112	  
3p-­‐2p	  
LOP-­‐2p	  
Elo-­‐2p	  
TabuSearch-­‐2p	  
Figure 4.10: Maximum Likelihoods for NFL panel data
explained further above, here it could be justiﬁed to give 1 and -1 points instead of
0 and 2 for a win and a loss, respectively. However, implementing this changes not
much and even reduces the average likelihood a bit. Another explanation could be the
sport itself. It might be due to the result generating probabilities themselves, that for
one sport diﬀerent ranking schemes are better suited then others. Indeed, it is easy to
show that in the space of transitive probability matrices, there are areas where each
of the considered systems is most likely to generate a ranking closest to the real one.
This is an interesting direction for further theoretical research.
4.8.3 Hypothesis testing
Now we are going further in the analysis of ranking systems than just observing which
ordering scheme is able to generate a higher maximum likelihood value. We will con-
sider two examples, which will help deepen the understanding of the problem, but will
also clearly highlight the limitations of this hypothesis testing approach, as described
in Section 4.6.
Consider the Bundesliga season 2011/2012. Looking at Figure 4.8 reveals that for this
data set the 3 point system performed better than the 2 point system. The diﬀerence
between the two maximum likelihood logs is 0.564. But the central question is "did
this MLE diﬀerence appear because the underlying unobservable probabilities make
the 3 point system more appropriate than the 2 point system in this season or could it
in fact be the other way around with the observation just happening by chance?".
To answer this question, assume the correctness of the Hypothesis H0: "The 2 point
system puts the teams in the correct order". We will test H0 against the alternative
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Hypothesis H1: "The 3 point system puts the teams in the correct order". Now, for the
two systems the probability matrices Pˆ2p(w) and Pˆ3p(w) are estimated. Using Pˆ2p(w)
5000 seasons are simulated. Then L(Pˆ2p(w)|wˆ) and L(Pˆ3p(w)|wˆ) are calculated for
each of the seasons. Their respective frequency distribution is depicted in Figure 4.11
(a) and (b). The distribution of their diﬀerence, which corresponds to the ratio of the
likelihoods without logs is plotted in Figure 4.11 (c).
Looking closely at the ﬁrst two diagrams reveals that the distribution of L(Pˆ3p(w)|wˆ)
is shifted a little bit to the left relative to the one of L(Pˆ2p(w)|wˆ). This is intuitively
correct because it is only natural that the probability matrix that generated the seasons
of the sample gives the higher likelihood values than the matrix Pˆ3p(w), which has
nothing to do with the season simulation. Now to ﬁnd out the conﬁdence level with
which we would be able to reject H0 one has to compare the observed likelihood ratio
to the likelihood ratio distribution in Figure 4.11 (c). This procedure shows us that
assuming the correctness of H0, the probability of the likelihood ratio being ≤ 0.564
is only 11%. So we are able to reject the hypothesis that the 2 point system gives the
correct ranking with test size α = 0.11, meaning that the probability of not making
an error of the ﬁrst kind is 0.89. One has to be careful not to misinterpret this result.
It means that we are able to reject the hypothesis that the 2 point system gives the
correct ranking. However, this does by no means imply that the 3 point system gives
the correct ranking.
Now let us conduct a second hypothesis test, this time using tennis data. A good
experiment would be to test for the correctness of the LOP system against the 3 point/2
point system in the year 2012. In this year the LOP produced a considerably higher
likelihood than the 2 point system (see Figure 4.9 ), so we would like to know if this was
just a random result or if we can actually conclude that the underlying probabilities
favor the LOP scheme in the sense of telling us the truth about the ordering of tennis
players. The hypothesis are:
1. H0: "The 2 point system puts the teams in the correct order"
2. H1: "The solution to the LOP puts the teams in the correct order"
Assuming the correctness of H0, we again estimate the probability matrices and then
simulate 5000 seasons. Hereby we always assume that the mij values stay constant,
i.e., the amount of times players meet is the same in every simulation. We proceed as
above by calculating the test statistic for the likelihood ratio and then comparing it to
the empirically observed one. We have:
LR2p,LOP = log(L(Pˆ2p(w)|w)))− log(L(PˆLOP (w)|w)) = −6.9103
The simulated test statistic tells us that in case H0 is correct, the probability of an
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Figure 4.11: Simulated test statistic for Bundesliga hypothesis test
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occurrence of such a small likelihood ratio is only 0.02%. It follows that we can reject
H0 with test size α = 0.02 (i.e., a conﬁdence level of 99.98%).
This method is, as already mentioned in Section 4.6, only useful to test if a ranking
scheme gives us the correct ranking. If one is very conﬁdent that a ranking system gives
a very good approximation to the optimal ranking, one could test the results of this
ranking system against the optimal ranking (either approximated by the Tabu Search
Algorithm or calculated by the Branch and Bound Algorithm). If this test fails to
reject that the ranking system is the correct ranking system, one could be very certain,
that there is no (signiﬁcantly) better ranking system. However, in the data we have
analyzed so far there has been no candidate for this good ranking system and every
test performed like this would lead to rejection of the hypothesis.
4.9 Conclusion
We constructed a statistical model describing the outcomes of sports matches. The
model assumes a transitive relationship between the relative strengths of the teams.
The resulting constraints turn out to be very restrictive, which is illustrated by the
rapidly shrinking size of the parameter space shown in appendix B. The incorporation of
ties as well as home/away asymmetries makes our model much more complicated than
the related isotonic regression problem. The discussed branch and bound algorithm is
capable of solving the problem for up to 12 teams. For larger data sets, a tabu search
heuristic has been proposed. The empirical subsection of the chapter ﬁrst illustrates
the structure of an optimized probability matrix with an example. We have shown
that in the example the maximum likelihood produced by the tabu search is more that
3000 times higher than the one resulting from an application of the 3-point system.
But this does not mean that the two rankings are strongly uncorrelated as seen from
the high value of Spearman's rank correlation coeﬃcient. Panel data has been used
to compare diﬀerent ranking systems in three types of sports. In soccer, data from
German Bundesliga and English Premier League have shown that the 2- and 3-point
systems are very close to each other in the maximum likelihoods they produce, which
is not a surprise when considering their structural similarity. Hopes were higher for the
performance of the Elo system, because as opposed to the traditional point systems
it considers the opponents strength. However, on average the generated MLEs were
in the same range as the ones from the n-point systems. This result also applies for
ATP tennis and NFL American football data. So the additional degree of complexity
seems to be enough of a justiﬁcation for not giving a recommendation towards an
introduction of the Elo system. A diﬀerence worth mentioning is that the ranking,
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which results from the LOP performs fairly well in tennis and American football, but
worse than everything else in soccer. We show that almost in every sample across
all considered types of sports we are able to improve on the rankings produced by
the considered systems by using tabu search. This illustrates that there might be a
system that is much better at ﬁnding the most likely correct ranking, possibly without
the inclusion of a great complexity. As a ﬁnal remark, we want to mention that the
framework presented in this chapter has its natural limitations and leaves out many
important aspects that should be considered when choosing or designing a ranking
scheme. Things like opponents incentives during a match and the resulting eﬀects on
the observers level of thrill or the occurrence of winning decision as late as possible
during a season could be interesting points for further research.
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4.10 Appendix
4.10.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4: Ignoring the away/home diﬀerentiation, we can write pikx as
pik. With 0 probabilities of draws, Equation (4.1) is now
pik = 1− pki
and therefore Equation (4.2) is then equivalent to
pik ≥ pil ⇔ pjk ≥ pjl
pi′k′ > pj′k′ ⇒ pl′j′ > pl′i′
(4.5)
Now we have to show that (SST ) =⇒ (4.5) and (4.5) =⇒ (SST ).
(SST ) =⇒ (4.5):
We are dividing this case into two cases: For pik ≥ 12 ≥ pjk we can see:
pij ≥ pkj = 1− pjk ≥ 1
2
SST
==⇒ pix ≥ pjx ∀x
For every other case we can assume wlog that pik ≥ pjk ≥ 12
pij ≥ 1
2
SST
==⇒ pix ≥ pjx ∀x
pij <
1
2
=⇒ pji > 1
2
SST
==⇒ pjk > pik
Which is a contradiction to the assumption, therefore pij ≥ 12 .
(4.5) =⇒ (SST ):
pjk > pik
(5)
=⇒ pli > plj ∀l
⇒ pii > pij pii=1/2====⇒ pij < 1
2
Proof of proposition Proposition 5: Deﬁne a ranking from best to worst ρ(i) : {1, .., n}(
{1, ..., n} such that pikx ≥ pjkx ⇒ ρ(i) < ρ(j) and pkix ≤ pkjx ⇒ ρ(i) < ρ(j).
pikx ≥ pjkx ⇔ ρ(i) < ρ(j)⇔ pily ≥ pjly ∀i, j, k, l, x, y
pkix ≥ pkjx ⇔ ρ(j) < ρ(i)⇔ pily ≥ pjly ∀i, j, k, l, x, y
pi′k′x > pj′k′x ⇔ ρ(j) < ρ(i) and ρ(i)  ρ(j)∃i′, j′, k′, x
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4.10.2 Parameter space
In this subsection we explore the eﬀect of transitivity conditions on the parameter
space of winning probabilities to illustrate the limitations enforced by it. To do that
we compare the size of the parameter space with transitivity to the space of unrestricted
winning probabilities Sn, e.g. every pij, pji fulﬁlling pij + pji = 1.
The space of parameters including the transitivity conditions is a subset of this set
Sn. Sn(R) is hereby deﬁned as the size of this space relative to Sn only considering
the restrictions for pij ∈ R. The unrestricted parameter space is in this simple case:
Sn = [0, 1]
n(n−1)
2 which can be easily seen by the fact that every pji is completely
determined by pij. The restricted space for n players and the transitivity conditions
for every (i, j) ∈ Kn with Kn = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, i < j} is therefore
Sn(Kn) =
bi,j+1∫
bi+1,j
Sn(Kn\{(i, j)})dpij
with
Sn((i0, j0)) =
bi0,j0+1∫
bi0+1,j0
dpi0j0
and
bi,j :=

pij, for (i, j) ∈ Kn
0.5, for i = j
0, else
As this fairly complicated recursive integral may be hard to interpret, Table 4.2 gives
the values for the relative size of the transitive parameter space for up to ﬁve teams.
It can be seen that the size rapidly shrinks and it is not hard to imagine that for a
league comprising e.g. 18 teams the conditions are in this sense very strict.
n 2 3 4 5 6 7
Relative
size
1 1
4
1
120
1
40320
1
203212800
1
19313344512000
Approximation 1 0.25 8.3× 10−3 2.5× 10−5 4.9× 10−9 5.2× 10−14
Table 4.2: Relative size of the transitive parameter space
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4.10.3 Code
The ﬁrst code listing shows the problem deﬁnition of an optimization with ﬁxed team
ordering, so that the ipopt framework will understand it.
1 #inc lude " nf l_nlp . hpp"
2
3 #inc lude <ca s s e r t >
4 #inc lude <iostream>
5 #inc lude <math . h>
6
7 s t a t i c i n t t=50;
8
9 s t a t i c i n t w [ 3 ] [ 5 0 ] [ 5 0 ] ;
10 s t a t i c double p [ 2 ] [ 5 0 ] [ 5 0 ] ;
11
12
13 us ing namespace Ipopt ;
14
15 // cons t ruc to r
16 nfl_NLP : : nfl_NLP ( i n t myw [ ] [ 5 0 ] [ 5 0 ] , double * myp [ ] [ 5 0 ] [ 5 0 ] , double*& ←↩
zielwert , i n t myt )
17 {
18 zielwert = &zw ;
19 t=myt ;
20
21 f o r ( i n t h=0; h<3; h++) {
22 f o r ( i n t k=0; k<t ; k++) {
23 f o r ( i n t l=0; l<t ; l++) {
24 w [ ht ] [ k ] [ l ]=myw [ ht ] [ k ] [ l ] ;
25 myp [ ht ] [ k ] [ l]=&p [ ht ] [ k ] [ l ] ;
26 }
27 }
28 }
29
30 }
31
32 // de s t ru c t o r
33 nfl_NLP : : ~ nfl_NLP ( )
34 {}
35
36 // r e tu rn s the s i z e o f the problem
37 bool nfl_NLP : : get_nlp_info ( Index& n , Index& m , Index& nnz_jac_g ,
38 Index& nnz_h_lag , IndexStyleEnum& ←↩
index_style )
39 {
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40 // The problem desc r ibed in nfl_NLP . hpp has 4 va r i ab l e s , x [ 0 ] ←↩
through x [ 3 ]
41 n = 2*pow (t , 2 ) ;
42
43 // one equa l i t y c on s t r a i n t and one i n e qua l i t y c on s t r a i n t
44 m = pow (t , 2 ) + 4*t*(t−1) ;
45
46 // in t h i s example the jacob ian i s dense and conta in s 8 nonzeros
47 nnz_jac_g = 2*m ;
48
49 // the he s s i an i s a l s o dense and has 16 t o t a l nonzeros , but we
50 // only need the lower l e f t corner ( s i n c e i t i s symmetric )
51 nnz_h_lag = 2*n−4*t ;
52
53 // use the C s t y l e index ing (0−based )
54 index_style = TNLP : : C_STYLE ;
55
56 re turn true ;
57 }
58
59 // r e tu rn s the va r i a b l e bounds
60 bool nfl_NLP : : get_bounds_info ( Index n , Number* x_l , Number* x_u ,
61 Index m , Number* g_l , Number* g_u )
62 {
63 // here , the n and m we gave IPOPT in get_nlp_info are passed back ←↩
to us .
64 // I f des i r ed , we could a s s e r t to make sure they are what we think ←↩
they are .
65
66 // the v a r i a b l e s have lower bounds o f 0
67 f o r ( Index i=0; i<2*t*t ; i++) {
68 x_l [ i ] = 0 . 0 ;
69 }
70
71 // the v a r i a b l e s have upper bounds o f 1
72 f o r ( Index i=0; i<2*t*t ; i++) {
73 x_u [ i ] = 1 . 0 ;
74 }
75
76
77 Index i = 0 ;
78 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
79 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
80 g_l [ i ] = −2e19 ;
81 g_u [ i ] = 1 . 0 ;
82 i++;
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83 }
84 }
85 f o r ( Index h=0; h<2; h++) {
86 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
87 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
88 i f (l<t−1) {
89 g_l [ i ] = −2e19 ;
90 g_u [ i ] = 0 . 0 ;
91 i++;
92 }
93 i f (k<t−1) {
94 g_l [ i ] = −2e19 ;
95 g_u [ i ] = 0 . 0 ;
96 i++;
97 }
98 }
99 }
100 }
101
102 re turn true ;
103 }
104
105 // r e tu rn s the i n i t i a l po int f o r the problem
106 bool nfl_NLP : : get_starting_point ( Index n , bool init_x , Number* x ,
107 bool init_z , Number* z_L , Number* ←↩
z_U ,
108 Index m , bool init_lambda ,
109 Number* lambda )
110 {
111 assert ( init_x == true ) ;
112 assert ( init_z == f a l s e ) ;
113 assert ( init_lambda == f a l s e ) ;
114
115 // i n i t i a l i z e to the g iven s t a r t i n g po int
116 f o r ( Index i=0; i<2*t*t ; i++) {
117 x [ i ] = 0 . 4 ;
118 }
119
120 re turn true ;
121 }
122
123 // r e tu rn s the value o f the ob j e c t i v e func t i on
124 bool nfl_NLP : : eval_f ( Index n , const Number* x , bool new_x , Number& ←↩
obj_value )
125 {
126 assert (n == 2*t*t ) ;
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127
128 obj_value=0;
129 Index i=0;
130 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
131 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
132 i f (k !=l ) {
133 obj_value += (−w [ 0 ] [ k ] [ l ]* log (x [ t*k+l ]+0.000001) − w←↩
[ 1 ] [ l ] [ k ]* log (x [ t*t+t*l+k ]+0.000001) − (w [ 2 ] [ k ] [ l]−w←↩
[ 0 ] [ k ] [ l]−w [ 1 ] [ l ] [ k ] ) *log(1−x [ t*k+l]−x [ t*t+t*l+k←↩
]+0.000001) ) ;
134
135 i++;
136 }
137 }
138 }
139
140 re turn true ;
141 }
142
143 // return the grad i en t o f the ob j e c t i v e func t i on grad_{x} f ( x )
144 bool nfl_NLP : : eval_grad_f ( Index n , const Number* x , bool new_x , Number*←↩
grad_f )
145 {
146 Index i=0;
147 f o r ( Index h=0; h<2; h++) {
148 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
149 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
150 i f (k !=l ) {
151 i f (h==0)
152 grad_f [ i ] = −w [ ht ] [ k ] [ l ] / ( x [ t*t*h+t*k+l←↩
]+0.000001) + (w [ 2 ] [ k ] [ l]−w [ ht ] [ k ] [ l]−w [1−h←↩
] [ l ] [ k ] ) /(1−x [ t*t*h+t*k+l]−x [ t*t*(1−h )+t*l+k←↩
]+0.000001) ;
153 e l s e
154 grad_f [ i ] = −w [ ht ] [ k ] [ l ] / ( x [ t*t*h+t*k+l←↩
]+0.000001) + (w [ 2 ] [ l ] [ k]−w [ ht ] [ k ] [ l]−w [1−h←↩
] [ l ] [ k ] ) /(1−x [ t*t*h+t*k+l]−x [ t*t*(1−h )+t*l+k←↩
]+0.000001) ;
155 }
156 e l s e {
157 grad_f [ i ] = 0 ;
158 }
159 i++;
160 }
161 }
162 }
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163
164 re turn true ;
165 }
166
167 // return the value o f the c on s t r a i n t s : g ( x )
168 bool nfl_NLP : : eval_g ( Index n , const Number* x , bool new_x , Index m , ←↩
Number* g )
169 {
170 Index i = 0 ;
171 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
172 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
173 g [ i ] = x [ t*k+l ]+x [ t*t+t*l+k ] ;
174 i++;
175 }
176 }
177 f o r ( Index h=0; h<2; h++) {
178 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
179 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
180 i f (l<t−1) {
181 g [ i ] = x [ t*t*h+t*k+l]−x [ t*t*h+t*k+l+1] ;
182 i++;
183 }
184 i f (k<t−1) {
185 g [ i ] = x [ t*t*h+t*(k+1)+l]−x [ t*t*h+t*k+l ] ;
186 i++;
187 }
188 }
189 }
190 }
191 re turn true ;
192 }
193
194 // return the s t r u c tu r e or va lue s o f the jacob ian
195 bool nfl_NLP : : eval_jac_g ( Index n , const Number* x , bool new_x ,
196 Index m , Index nele_jac , Index* iRow , Index ←↩
*jCol ,
197 Number* values )
198 {
199 i f ( values == NULL ) {
200 // return the s t r u c tu r e o f the jacob ian
201
202 // t h i s p a r t i c u l a r jacob ian i s dense
203
204
205 Index z=0;
206 Index r=0;
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207 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
208 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
209 iRow [ z ] = r ;
210 jCol [ z ] = t*k+l ;
211 z++;
212 iRow [ z ] = r ;
213 jCol [ z ] = t*t+t*l+k ;
214 z++;
215
216 r++;
217 }
218 }
219 f o r ( Index h=0; h<2; h++) {
220 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
221 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
222 i f (l<t−1) {
223 iRow [ z ] = r ;
224 jCol [ z ] = t*t*h+t*k+l ;
225 z++;
226 iRow [ z ] = r ;
227 jCol [ z ] = t*t*h+t*k+l+1;
228 z++;
229 r++;
230 }
231 i f (k<t−1) {
232 iRow [ z ] = r ;
233 jCol [ z ] = t*t*h+t*k+l ;
234 z++;
235 iRow [ z ] = r ;
236 jCol [ z ] = t*t*h+t*(k+1)+l ;
237 z++;
238 r++;
239 }
240 }
241 }
242 }
243 assert (z==nele_jac ) ;
244 }
245 e l s e {
246 Index z=0;
247 Index r=0;
248 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
249 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
250 values [ z ] = 1 ;
251 z++;
252 values [ z ] = 1 ;
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253 z++;
254
255 r++;
256 }
257 }
258 f o r ( Index h=0; h<2; h++) {
259 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
260 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
261 i f (l<t−1) {
262 values [ z ] = 1 ;
263 z++;
264 values [ z ] = −1;
265 z++;
266 r++;
267 }
268 i f (k<t−1) {
269 values [ z ] = −1;
270 z++;
271 values [ z ] = 1 ;
272 z++;
273 r++;
274 }
275 }
276 }
277 }
278 assert (z==nele_jac ) ;
279 }
280
281 re turn true ;
282 }
283
284 // return the s t r u c tu r e or va lue s o f the he s s i an
285 bool nfl_NLP : : eval_h ( Index n , const Number* x , bool new_x ,
286 Number obj_factor , Index m , const Number* lambda←↩
,
287 bool new_lambda , Index nele_hess , Index* iRow ,
288 Index* jCol , Number* values )
289 {
290 i f ( values == NULL ) {
291 // return the s t r u c tu r e . This i s a symmetric matrix , so we f i l l←↩
the lower l e f t
292 // t r i a n g l e only .
293 Index i=0;
294 f o r ( Index h=0; h<2; h++) {
295 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
296 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
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297 i f (k !=l ) {
298 iRow [ i ] = t*t*h+t*k+l ;
299 jCol [ i ] = t*t*h+t*k+l ;
300 i++;
301
302 iRow [ i ] = t*t*h+t*k+l ;
303 jCol [ i ] = t*t*(1−h )+t*l+k ;
304 i++;
305 }
306 }
307 }
308 }
309 }
310 e l s e {
311 // return the va lue s . This i s a symmetric matrix , f i l l the ←↩
lower l e f t
312 // t r i a n g l e only
313
314 Index i=0;
315 f o r ( Index h=0; h<2; h++) {
316 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
317 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
318 i f (k !=l ) {
319 i f (h==0){
320 values [ i ] = obj_factor *( w [ ht ] [ k ] [ l ]* pow (x←↩
[ t*t*h+t*k+l ]+0.000001 , −2) + (w [ 2 ] [ k ] [ l←↩
]−w [ ht ] [ k ] [ l]−w [1−h ] [ l ] [ k ] ) *pow((1−x [ t*t←↩
*h+t*k+l]−x [ t*t*(1−h )+t*l+k ]+0.000001)←↩
,−2) ) ;
321 i++;
322 // std : : cout << " va lues [ " << i << " ] = " << ←↩
va lue s [ i ] << std : : endl ;
323 values [ i ] = obj_factor *0 . 5* ( (w [ 2 ] [ k ] [ l]−w←↩
[ ht ] [ k ] [ l]−w [1−h ] [ l ] [ k ] ) *pow((1−x [ t*t*h+←↩
t*k+l]−x [ t*t*(1−h )+t*l+k ]+0.000001) ,−2) )←↩
;
324 }
325 e l s e {
326 values [ i ] = obj_factor *( w [ ht ] [ k ] [ l ]* pow (x←↩
[ t*t*h+t*k+l ]+0.000001 , −2) + (w [ 2 ] [ l ] [ k←↩
]−w [ ht ] [ k ] [ l]−w [1−h ] [ l ] [ k ] ) *pow((1−x [ t*t←↩
*h+t*k+l]−x [ t*t*(1−h )+t*l+k ]+0.000001)←↩
,−2) ) ;
327 i++;
328 // std : : cout << " va lues [ " << i << " ] = " << ←↩
va lue s [ i ] << std : : endl ;
102
CHAPTER 4. PROBABILISTIC TRANSITIVITY IN SPORTS
329 values [ i ] = obj_factor *0 . 5* ( (w [ 2 ] [ l ] [ k]−w←↩
[ ht ] [ k ] [ l]−w [1−h ] [ l ] [ k ] ) *pow((1−x [ t*t*h+←↩
t*k+l]−x [ t*t*(1−h )+t*l+k ]+0.000001) ,−2) )←↩
;
330 }
331 i++;
332 }
333 }
334 }
335 }
336 }
337
338 re turn true ;
339 }
340
341 void nfl_NLP : : finalize_solution ( SolverReturn status ,
342 Index n , const Number* x , const ←↩
Number* z_L , const Number* z_U ,
343 Index m , const Number* g , const ←↩
Number* lambda ,
344 Number obj_value ,
345 const IpoptData* ip_data ,
346 IpoptCalculatedQuantities* ip_cq )
347 {
348 // here i s where we s t o r e the s o l u t i o n to v a r i a b l e s
349 // so we could use the s o l u t i o n .
350
351 f o r ( Index h=0; h<2; h++) {
352 f o r ( Index k=0; k<t ; k++) {
353 f o r ( Index l=0; l<t ; l++) {
354 // std : : cout << x [ t * t *h+t *k+l ] << " " ;
355 p [ ht ] [ k ] [ l ]=x [ t*t*h+t*k+l ] ;
356 }
357 // std : : cout << " " << std : : endl ;
358 }
359 // std : : cout << " " << std : : endl ;
360 }
361
362 zw = obj_value ;
363 }
The second code snippet shows how the program reads 5 NFL seasons, puts them in
diﬀerent orders, and then optimizes the probabilities and prints them.
1 i n t main ( i n t argv , char * argc [ ] )
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2 {
3
4 // Create a new in s t ance o f the nlp
5 SmartPtr<TNLP> mynlp ;
6 SmartPtr<TNLP> mynlp2 ;
7
8 // Create a new in s t ance o f IpoptApp l i ca t ion
9 SmartPtr<IpoptApplication> app = IpoptApplicationFactory ( ) ;
10
11 // Change some opt ions
12 app−>Options ( )−>SetIntegerValue ( " p r i n t_ l ev e l " , 0) ;
13 app−>Options ( )−>SetNumericValue ( " t o l " , 1e−4) ;
14 app−>Options ( )−>SetStringValue ( "mu_strategy" , " adapt ive " ) ;
15 app−>Options ( )−>SetStringValue ( " output_f i l e " , " ipopt . out" ) ;
16
17 // I n t i a l i z e the IpoptApp l i ca t ion and proce s s the opt ions
18 ApplicationReturnStatus status ;
19 status = app−>Initialize ( ) ;
20 i f ( status != Solve_Succeeded ) {
21 std : : cout << std : : endl << std : : endl << "*** Error during ←↩
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n ! " << std : : endl ;
22 re turn ( i n t ) status ;
23 }
24
25 srand ( time ( NULL ) ) ;
26
27
28 double * z ; // Var iab le f o r the l i k e l i h o o d
29 i n t tempW50 [ 3 ] [ 5 0 ] [ 5 0 ] ; // temporary r e s u l t matr i ce s
30
31 f o r ( Index h=0; h<3; h++)
32 f o r ( Index k=0; k<50; k++)
33 f o r ( Index l=0; l<50; l++)
34 tempW50 [ ht ] [ k ] [ l ]=w050 [ ht ] [ k ] [ l ] ;
35
36 double l [ 1 4 ] [ 6 ] ;
37
38 // f o r the years 2000 t i l l 2005 , the n f l data i s read from the f i l e s
39 f o r ( i n t jahr=100; jahr<105; jahr++) {
40 i n t t ;
41 i f (jahr<95)
42 t=28;
43 e l s e i f (jahr<99)
44 t=30;
45 e l s e i f (jahr<102)
46 t=31;
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47 e l s e
48 t=32;
49
50 t=10;
51
52
53 einlesenNfl (jahr , t ) ;
54
55 // order accord ing to the 2 po int system and run the ←↩
opt imiza t i on
56 ordneNachPunkteSystem50 (2 , w50 , t ) ;
57 mynlp2 = new nfl_NLP (w50 , p50 , z , t ) ;
58 app−>OptimizeTNLP ( mynlp2 ) ;
59 l [ jahr ] [1]=−*z ;
60
61 // order accord ing to the 3 po int system and run the ←↩
opt imiza t i on
62 ordneNachPunkteSystem50 (3 , w50 , t ) ;
63 mynlp2 = new nfl_NLP (w50 , p50 , z , t ) ;
64 app−>OptimizeTNLP ( mynlp2 ) ;
65 l [ jahr ] [2]=−*z ;
66
67 // order accord ing to the LOP system and run the opt imiza t i on
68 ordneNachLOP50 (w50 , t ) ;
69 mynlp2 = new nfl_NLP (w50 , p50 , z , t ) ;
70 app−>OptimizeTNLP ( mynlp2 ) ;
71 l [ jahr ] [3]=−*z ;
72
73 // order accord ing to the ELO system and run the opt imiza t i on
74 ordneNachSchach50 (w50 , t ) ;
75 mynlp2 = new nfl_NLP (w50 , p50 , z , t ) ;
76 app−>OptimizeTNLP ( mynlp2 ) ;
77 l [ jahr ] [4]=−*z ;
78
79 // run the tabu search f o r 100 i t e r a t i o n s and then run the ←↩
opt imiza t i on
80 l [ jahr ] [ 5 ]= tabuSearch50 (100 ,t ) ;
81
82 // p r in t out the r e s u l t s
83 cout<<l [ jahr ][0]<<" "<<l [ jahr ][1]<<" "<<l [ jahr ][2]<<" "<<l [ jahr←↩
][3]<<" "<<l [ jahr ][4]<<" "<<l [ jahr ][5]<<endl ;
84 cout<<endl ;
85 }
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